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THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT-ANTI-POVERTY LEG­
ISLATION IN THE MODERN ERA: ADVOCATING JUDICIAL SCRUTINY 
UNDER A FEMINIST POLICy-CENTERED ANALYSIS 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act ("the FLSA" 
or "the Act") in 1938.1 The major provisions of this Act established 
a minimum wage fioor2 and overtime provisions3 for employees 
"engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for com­
merce."4 Emerging as the country struggled to recover from the 
Great Depression, the Act represented a collective effort granting 
hope of economic prosperity for millions of American workers. 
Fundamental to the purpose of the Act was the notion that 
[t]his nation cannot build a stable industry that can adequately 
support all its people until those who work are given a larger 
share in the yield. . . . Continued low wage incomes ... will 
continue to undermine the stability of markets for both farm and 
factory products. It is only by a wider distribution of our national 
income that we can expand our markets, increase production and 
gradually eliminate unemployment.5 
Balanced against this sentiment, however, was the fear that the 
minimum wage and overtime rates would effectively "throw[] 
thousands of people out of work" as employers struggled to make 
the same profit while paying higher wages.6 Thus, the FLSA at­
tempted to strike a delicate balance between eradicating the detri­
mental conditions of some workers, and preserving entry-level, low­
skill positions in the economy.? 
1. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended 
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994)). 
2. See § 6, 52 Stat. at 1062-63 (current version at 29 U.S.c. § 206 (1994)). 
3. See § 7(a)(1)-(3), 52 Stat. at 1063 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1994)). 
4. § 6(a), 52 Stat. at 1062 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (1994)). 
5. 83 CONGo REc. H9264 (daily ed. June 14, 1938) (statement of Rep. Keller). 
6. 83 CONGo REC. S9171 (daily ed. June 14, 1938) (statement of Sen. Bailey). 
7. See infra Part I.A for a discussion of the 1938 version of the FLSA. 
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In 1961, Congress amended the FLSA and expanded the cover­
age by shifting the focus of the Act from the employee to the enter­
prise.8 In this amendment, Congress extended the Act's provisions 
to employees of large "enterprisers] engaged in commerce or the 
production of goods for commerce."9 The enterprise concept thus 
broadened the focus of the FLSA from an employee's activity to 
the nature of an employer's business.lO Once again, some members 
of Congress voiced the concern that increasing the scope of the 
Act's coverage would further decrease the number of entry-level, 
low-skill jobs available to part-time workers, the elderly, and 
students.11 
The most recent amendment to the enterprise concept oc­
curred in 1972 when Congress added "preschool" to the definition 
of enterprise.n In doing so, however, Congress not only failed to 
include a definition of "preschool,"13 it also failed to substantively 
debate the purpose of treating a "preschool" as a covered enter­
prise. Consequently, the scope of the term "preschool" is 
ambiguous. 
This Note analyzes the interpretive methods employed by fed­
eral courts in determining what type of business is considered a 
"preschool" within the meaning of the Act. This Note concludes 
that the confusion in the courts concerning what businesses are con­
8. See Act of May 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, 75 Stat. 65 (codified as amended at 
29 U.S.C. § 203 (1994»; see infra notes 35 and 36 for the definitions of "enterprise" and 
"enterprise engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce." 
9. § 2(s), 75 Stat. at 65 (emphasis added). 
10. The constitutionality of the enterprise concept was the subject of heated de­
bate in Congress and vigorously litigated in the courts. See generally 107 CONGo REC. 
H4589 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1961) (statements of Rep. Hiestand) (debating the constitu­
tionality of the enterprise concept); see also Maryland V. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 204 
(1968), overruled on other grounds by National League of Cities V. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 
(1976) (holding that the "enterprise concept" in the 1961 amendment to the FLSA is 
constitutional). The substance of the debate surrounded whether Congress had, in cre­
ating the "enterprise concept," gone beyond the power granted Congress in the Com­
merce Clause of the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. 
11. See 107 CONGo REc. S5952 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 1961) (statement of Sen. 
Bennett). 
12. Act of June 23, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 906, 86 Stat. 235, 375 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.c. § 203(r)(1), (s)(4) (1994». See infra note 77 for the text of the 
1972 amendment to the FLSA. 
13. Compare Act of June 23, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 906, 86 Stat. 235, 275 
with 29 U.S.C. § 203(v), (w) (1994). See infra notes 67 and 68 for the definitions of 
"elementary" and "secondary" school. In this amendment, Congress made its intent 
clear by defining what "elementary" and "secondary" schools were and how the Act's 
provisions related to the state's authority to regulate elementary and secondary schools. 
29 U.S.C. § 203(v), (w) (1994). 
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sidered "preschools" under the 1972 amendment to the FLSA is 
justified. Federal courts have had difficulty interpreting the word 
"preschool" because either a broad or a narrow interpretation pro­
duces results that are inconsistent with the FLSA's anti-poverty 
purpose. Until these inadequacies are addressed by Congress, fed­
eral courts must continue to interpret a vague amendment that fails 
to resolve the underlying policy tensions evident in the Act. 
This Note asserts that without congressional clarification of 
what businesses are considered a "preschool," the only effective 
method of interpreting the 1972 amendment is a policy-centered ap­
proach. A policy-centered method is advocated because the tradi­
tional methods of interpretation collapse under the weight of an 
issue that is inextricably entwined with public policy issues. Fur­
thermore, although other interpretive methods exist that would ad­
dress the conflict in policy,14 this Note advocates a feminist policy­
centered analysis. This feminist perspective recognizes that either a 
broad or narrow interpretation of the 1972 amendment adversely 
impacts low-income women-a result entirely at odds with the fun­
damental purposes of the Act. 
For instance, a broad interpretation that holds that preschool 
workers should be paid minimum wage may ultimately result in in­
creased costs for day care. This increased cost, without adequate 
subsidies, disproportionately impacts low-income women's ability 
to participate in the economy on equal terms. Similarly, because 
women comprise the majority of the workforce in the pre-kinder­
garten childcare industry,15 a narrow interpretation that does not 
confer rights under the FLSA, results in a disproportionate impact 
on a predominately female sector of the workforce. 
Finally, this Note argues that the judiciary should, in the inter­
est of justice, fully articulate and comment on the conflicting policy 
issues that arise in interpreting the Act. The Act provides a mecha­
nism that justifies such a discourse.16 Section 204(d)(1) of the Act 
provides for biennial reports by the Department of Labor to Con­
14. For example, practical reasoning, or the use of positive political theory as a 
method of interpretation might broaden the analysis beyond the limitations of the three 
traditional methods of interpretation used by the courts. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, 
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
321 (1990); McNollgast, Comment, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political The­
ory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1994). 
15. See infra note 126 for Bureau of Labor Statistics regarding workforce 
demographics in the pre-kindergarten child care industry. 
16. See 29 U.S.c. § 204(d)(I) (1994). This Note does not advocate that the courts 
rewrite the statute in conformity with its policy analysis. Rather, this Note asserts that 
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gress to suggest legislative reformP Thus, the judiciary, through a 
policy-centered analysis, may help identify the deficiencies in the 
Act's provisions. 
Part I of this Note will explore the historical background of the 
FLSA and its major amendments leading to the treatment of "pre­
school" as a covered enterprise. Part II provides the reader with a 
brief overview of the methods of statutory interpretation used by 
federal courts in interpreting the 1972 amendment to the FLSA, 
and reviews analtemative feminist method of statutory interpreta­
tion. Part III analyzes the interpretational approaches employed by 
federal courts in addressing the question of what businesses are 
within the scope of the FLSA through the inclusion of "preschool" 
as a covered enterprise. Part IV comments on the effectiveness of 
the various interpretational approaches employed by these courts 
and proposes a policy-centered method of analysis that is founded 
on feminist concerns. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
On June 25, 1938 Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards 
Act.18 In passing the Act, Congress was concerned with "the exist­
ence, in industries engaged in commerce or in the production of 
goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental to the mainte­
nance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, effi­
ciency, and general well-being of workers."19 Thus, the FLSA was 
created to correct, as quickly as possible, employment conditions 
that Congress believed were detrimental to the worker.20 To effec­
tuate this goal, the FLSA created a minimum wage floor21 and a 
ceiling of a maximum number of hours22 for each "employee who is 
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for 
the courts utilize the statutory mechanism provided by Congress to comment on the 
policy implications, in an effort to facilitate legislative reform. 
17. See id. 
18. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, §§ 2-19, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as 
amended at 29 V.S.c. §§ 201-219 (1994». 
19. § 2(a), 52 Stat. at 1060 (current version at 29 V.S.C. § 202(a) (1994)). 
20. See § 2(b), 52 Stat. at 1060 (current version at 29 V.S.c. § 202(b) (1994)). "It 
is hereby declared policy of this Act ... to correct and as rapidly as practicable to 
eliminate the conditions above referred to in such industries without substantially cur­
tailing employment or earning power." [d. 
21. See § 6, 52 Stat. at 1062-63 (current version at 29 V.S.c. § 206 (1994)). 
22. See § 7, 52 Stat. at 1063-64 (current version at 29 V.S.c. § 207(a)(2) (1994». 
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commerce."23 
Congress, however, feared that too radical a change would 
counteract the Act's stated purpose of correcting detrimental em­
ployment conditions and result instead in the elimination of posi­
tions altogether.24 Underlying this fear was the belief that if 
employers had limited money for wages, imposing a minimum wage 
would necessarily lead to the elimination of other positions.25 To 
address this fear and to ensure a smooth transition, the provisions 
of the Act were to be implemented gradually, with full effect occur­
ring seven years after the effective date of the Act.26 
Congress created the FLSA to address specific labor conditions 
that had contributed to 
[t]he exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal 
position with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively 
defenseless against the denial of a living wage [that] is not only 
detrimental to their health and well-being but casts a direct bur­
den for their support upon the community.27 
Congress passed the FLSA pursuant to the legislative power dele­
gated to Congress by the Commerce Clause as the United States 
23. §§ 6(a), 7(a), 52 Stat. at 1062-63 (current version at 29 v.s.c. §§ 206(a), 
207(a) (1994)). The FLSA also prohibited the use of oppressive child labor in activities 
related to interstate commerce. See § 12(a)-(b), 52 Stat. at 1067 (current version at 29 
V.S.C. § 213(C) (1994)). Additionally, the FLSA includes numerous other exemptions 
that are beyond the scope of this Note. See § 13,52 Stat. at 1067-68 (current version at 
29 V.S.c. § 213(a)-(h) (1994)). 
24. See § 2(b), 52 Stat. at 1060 (current version at 29 V.S.C. § 202(b) (1994)). 
25. See 83 CONGo REC. S9164 (daily ed. June 14, 1938) (statement of Sen. 
Thomas) ("We all recognized the hazard of placing this floor too high at the start with­
out giving industry time to adjust itself."). 
26. See § 6(a)(I)-(3), 52 Stat. at 1062-63 (current version at 29 V.S.c. § 206(b) 
(1994)): 
(a) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who is engaged in com­
merce or in the production of goods for commerce wages at the following 
rates­
(1) during the first year from the effective date of this section, not less 
than 25 cents an hour, 
(2) during the next six years from such date, not less than 30 cents an 
hour, 
(3) after the expiration of seven years from such date, not less than 40 
cents an hour, or the rate (not less than 30 cents an hour) prescribed in the 
applicable order of the Administrator issued under section 8, whichever is 
lower. 
Id. 
27. 83 CoNG. REc. HA2111 (appendix to daily ed. May 23, 1938) (remarks of 
Rep. Cochran) (quoting the commentary of Hughes, c.J., from an editorial in the St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch, May 22, 1938). 
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was emerging from the Great Depression.28 By exerting financial 
pressure on employers through the minimum wage and overtime 
provisions of the Act, Congress helped employees gain bargaining 
power.29 This increased bargaining power contributed to improving 
the labor conditions of many workers. Additionally, because the 
Act's overtime provisions discouraged overtime, work was distrib­
uted more equitably among a greater number of employees, thus 
lowering unemployment rates.30 
Congress recognized that amendments to the Act would be 
needed as the country's labor conditions evolved.31 Accordingly, 
the Act contains a provision under which the Administrator of the 
Wage and Hour Division is to compile data biennially and make 
any necessary legislative recommendations for future amendments 
to the Act. 32 
B. The 1961 Amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act 
The 1961 amendment to the FLSA expanded the Act's cover­
28. See u.s. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. In congressional debates and after enact­
ment, some questioned whether Congress had, in enacting the FLSA, exceeded the 
powers granted it under the Commerce Clause. See Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 
317 U.S. 564 (1943). In Jacksonville Paper, the Supreme Court broadly construed Con­
gress's purpose for enacting the FLSA as extending federal control over the wages and 
hours of the employee to the "farthest reaches." Jacksonville Paper, 317 U.S. at 567; see 
also Mitchell v. C & P Shoe Corp., 286 F.2d 109,114 (5th Cir. 1960) (holding that the 
activities of the individual employee, not the employer's activities, determine coverage 
under the Act; thus, Congress was within the limits of its commerce power); Robert N. 
Willis, The Evolution of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 26 U. MIAMI L. REv. 607, 613 
(1972) (indicating that Jacksonville Paper is considered the foundation for the notion 
that the Act should be liberally construed to effectuate Congress's objectives). 
29. See Murray v. Noblesville Milling Co., 131 F.2d 470, 472-73 (7th Cir. 1942) 
(stating that the requirements of the FLSA reinforce employees' bargaining power by 
prohibiting wages to be below a certain level). 
30. In modern times, due to the proliferation and expense of fringe benefits, some 
employers require regular overtime as a condition of employment because it is less 
expensive than hiring a new employee. See Alfred W. Blumrosen & Jerome M. Culp, 
Reducing the Workweek to Expand Employment: A Survey of Industrial Response, 9 
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 393, 412 (1984) ("[Elmployers faced with the choice between let­
ting their full-time employees work overtime or hiring more employees will balance 
overtime against initial hiring costs, which can amount to thousands of dollars."). 
31. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 4(d), 52 Stat. 1060, 1062 
(current version at 29 U.S.c. § 204(d)(1) (1994». 
32. See id. In its biennial report to Congress, the Secretary of Labor reports liti­
gation activity relevant to enforcement of the FLSA. See, e.g., EMPLOYMENT STAN. 
DARDS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MINIMUM WAGE AND MAXIMUM HOURS 
STANDARDS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (1993) (reporting for 1991) 
[hereinafter 1991 MINIMUM WAGE AND MAXIMUM HOURS REpORT TO CONGRESS1; see 
infra Part IV for a recommendation of how this section of the Act should be used by 
the judiciary. 
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age to include employees of enterprises "engaged. in commerce or 
in the production of goods for commerce. "33 Congress enacted this 
amendment to promote a more widespread distribution of purchas­
ing power essential to the growth of the economy.34 To clarify the 
scope of the amendment, Congress defined "enterprise"35 and the 
phrase "enterprise engaged in commerce or the production of 
goods for commerce. "36 
33. Act of May 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 6, 75 Stat. 65, 69 (current version at 
29 U.S.c. § 203 (1994». Previously, coverage had been based upon "each employee 
who is engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce." Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 6, 52 Stat. 1060, 1062-63 (current version at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 206 (1994». Thus, the 1961 amendment shifted the focus from the employee to the 
nature of the employer's business. This shift became known as the "enterprise con­
cept." See, e.g., Marshall v. Sideris, 524 F. Supp. 521, 527 (D. Neb. 1981), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom. Donovan v. Sideris, 688 F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1982) (the enterprise con­
cept extended coverage under the FLSA). 
34. See 107 CONGo REC. H4588 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1961) (statement of Rep. 
Lane). 
35. Act of May 5, 1961 § 2(r), 75 Stat. at 65 (current version at 29 U.S.c. 
§ 203(r)(I) (1994». Section 2(r) defines "enterprise" as: 
[T]he related activities performed (either through unified operation or com­
mon control) by any person or persons for a common business purpose, and 
includes all such activities whether performed in one or more establishments 
or by one or more corporate or other organizational units including depart­
ments of an establishment operated through leasing arrangements, but shall 
not include the related activities performed for such enterprise by an in­
dependent contractor. 
Id. 
36. § 2(s), 75 Stat. at 66 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1994». Section 
2(s) defines "enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for com­
merce" as: 
[A]ny of the following in the activities of which employees are so engaged, 
including employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods that 
have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person: 
(1) any such enterprise which has one or more retail or service establish­
ments if the annual gross volume of sales of such enterprise is not less than 
$1,000,000, exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level which are separately 
stated and if such enterprise purchases or receives goods for resale that move 
or have moved across State lines (not in deliveries from the reselling establish­
ment) which amount in total annual volume to $250,000 or more; 
(2) any such enterprise which is engaged in the business of operating a 
street, suburban or interurban electric railway, or local trolley or motorbus 
carrier if the annual gross volume of sales of such enterprise is not less than 
$1,000,000, exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level which are separately 
stated; 
(3) any establishment of any such enterprise, except establishments and 
enterprises referred to in other paragraphs of this subsection, which has em­
ployees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce if 
the annual gross volume of sales of such enterprise is not less than $1,000,000; 
(4) any such enterprise which is engaged in the business of construction 
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The enterprise concept broadened coverage under the mini­
mum wage and maximum hour provisions by shifting the focus from 
an employee's activity to the nature of an employer's business.37 
Under this amendment, employers were required to comply with 
the minimum wage and overtime provisions not only for employees 
who were engaged in interstate commerce,38 but also for any em­
ployee of an enterprise that met the monetary requirements of 
coverage.39 
The 1961 amendment corrected an inconsistency in the Act.40 
Previously, the Act focused on the nature of the employee's posi­
tion. This focus resulted in a discrepancy because within one busi­
ness, one employee might work on goods that go into interstate 
commerce, while other employees might not be working with such 
or reconstruction, or both, if the annual gross volume from the business of 
such enterprise is not less than $350,000; 
(5) any gasoline service establishment if the annual gross volume of sales 
of such establishment is not less than $250,000, exclusive of excise taxes at the 
retail level which are separately stated: 
Provided, That an establishment shall not be considered to be an enterprise 
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or a part of 
an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for com­
merce, and the sales of such establishment shall not be included for the pur­
pose of determining the annual gross volume of sales of any enterprise for the 
purpose of this subsection, if the only employees of such establishment are the 
owner thereof or persons standing in the relationship of parent, spouse, or 
child of such owner. 
[d. 
37. See Marshall v. Whitehead, 463 F. Supp. 1329, 1359 (D. Fla. 1978) ("The in­
tent of Congress in adopting the 'enterprise' concept was to extend coverage of the Act 
to all employees of an employer if some of his employees met the commerce crite­
rion."); see also Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled on other grounds by 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In Wirtz, 28 states brought an 
action claiming that the 1966 amendments were unconstitutional as they applied to the 
states. See id. at 187-88. In this landmark case, the Supreme Court held that the 1961 
amendment was created to extend protection to the "fellow employees of any employee 
who would have been protected by the original Act, but not to enlarge the class of 
employers subject to the Act." Id. at 188. That is, prior to the 1961 amendment, a 
particular employer might have some employees covered and others not covered at all, 
depending on their individual jobs. See id. 
38. See Act of May 5,1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, §§ 5-6, 75 Stat. 65, 69-70 (current 
version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (1994». See supra note 26 for the text of the 1938 
version describing the original scope of coverage under the Act. The original language 
of the 1938 FLSA minimum wage and overtime provisions required the employee to 
have direct involvement in commerce. 
39. See § 3(r), (s), 75 Stat. at 65-66 (current version at 29 U.S.c. § 203(r)(I), 
(s)(1 )-(5)(1994». 
40. See 107 CONGo REC. S5827 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 1961) (statement of Sen. Javits) 
("One of the objectives of the bill is to minimize those areas in which fragmentation of 
coverage already exists."). 
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goods. Therefore, within one business, some employees would be 
protected by the Act, but other employees would not be afforded 
such protection. The 1961 amendment thus filled the gaps that ex­
isted in coverage in the situation where a single employer had some 
employees who were covered by the Act and others that were not 
covered by the Act.41 However, the amendment did not necessarily 
extend coverage to additional employers because only those em­
ployers who already engaged in some form of interstate commerce, 
and met the FLSA's economic criteria, were affected.42 
The 1961 amendment passed despite vehement debate in Con­
gress.43 One concern involved fears that the Act would generate 
increased labor costs,44 and thus have the counterproductive effect 
of actually raising unemployment levels.45 Members of Congress 
feared that the broadened scope would effect entry-level, low-skill 
workers, such as students, the elderly, and part time workers­
populations of workers that the Act was intended to help.46 Con­
gress addressed this issue by creating restrictions on the applicabil­
ity of the FLSA to a business unless, for instance, it met a minimum 
requisite gross volume of sales. Such restrictions limited the expan­
41. See id. 
42. See S. REP. No. 87-145, at 3 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1620, 
1662-63; Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 188 (the purpose of the 1961 amendment was not to enlarge 
the class of employers subject to the Act). But see Mack A. Player, Enterprise Coverage 
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act: An Assessment of the First Generation, 28 VAND. 
L. REv. 283, 335 (1975) (noting that Justice Harlan, in Maryland v. Wirtz, created signif­
icant confusion by concluding that the 1961 amendment did not enlarge the class of 
employers). 
43. See, e.g., 107 CoNG. REC. H5951-52 (daily ed. Apr. 14,1961); 107 CONGo REc. 
H4808-10 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1961); 107 CONGo REc. H4585-89 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1961); 
see also S. REP. No. 87-145, at 76-111, reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1671-1706. 
44. See S. REP. No. 87-145, at 78, reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1674. 
45. See 107 CONGo REc. S5952 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 1961) (statement of Sen. 
Bennett). 
[M]any small businesses not previously covered, are going to find it difficult to 
meet the minimum wage. . .. The result will be either that they will be forced 
to cut marginal producers out of their labor force, or they may be compelled 
to go out of business. Either way, the result is unemployment. And the unem­
ployment will affect the very same people this bill is supposed to help. 
Id. 
46. See 107 CONGo REc. S5951 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 1961) (statement of Sen. 
Bennett). 
If this bill passes, who will be hurt? First, the elderly, trying to supplement 
social security or other income by low-paying jobs. Second, the handicapped, 
and the less efficient workers, who are the first to go when a reduction in work 
force becomes necessary. Third, students and other part-time workers. 
Id. 
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sion of coverage under this amendment.47 
Thus, in order to obtain passage, proponents of the amend­
ment were forced to agree upon a complicated regulatory scheme 
to determine whether an enterprise was covered under the ACt.48 
For instance, the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare report 
discussed how business activities would be considered part of a sin­
gle enterprise and thus subject the enterprise to the FLSA's provi­
sions if such activities are for a "common business purpose."49 
However, the Committee report also stated that where the pur­
poses of the activities are unrelated to one another, even though 
operated by the same employer, the employees not individually en­
gaging in interstate commerce were not covered by the FLSA.sO 
Because Congress intended only to extend coverage to additional 
employees of enterprises that either substantially engaged in com­
merce or in the production of goods for commerce,S1 application of 
the amendment's new provisions was to be determined on a case­
by-case basis. 
C. The 1966 Amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act 
In 1966 Congress again amended the FLSA.S2 Specifically, the 
1966 amendment broadened the scope of coverage under the "en­
terprise"s3 and "enterprise engaged in the production of goods for 
47. See Act of May 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 2(s)(1)-(5), 75 Stat. 65,66 (cur­
rent version at 29 U.S.c. § 203(s) (1994». The amendment also contained such specific 
exemptions as alternate rates for United States territories. See § 5(c), 75 Stat. at 67-69 
(current version at 29 U.S.c. § 206(c) (1994». 
48. See, e.g., § 2(s)(1)-(5), 75 Stat. at 66 (current version at 29 U.S.c. § 203(s) 
(1994». 
49. S. REp. No. 87-145, at 40-41, reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1660 (report of 
the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare). 
50. See id. 
51. See id., reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1662. 
52. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 
830 (current version at 29 U.S.C § 203(m) (1994». 
53. § 102(a), 80 Stat. at 831. This amendment redefined the definition of enter­
prise to: 
For the purposes of this subsection, the activities performed by any person or 
persons-(l) in connection with the operation of Ii hospital, an institution pri­
marily engaged in the care of the sick, the aged, the mentally ill or defective 
who reside on the premises of such institution, a school for mentally or physi­
cally handicapped or gifted children, an elementary or secondary school, or an 
institution of higher education (regardless of whether or not such hospital, 
institution, or school is public or private or operated for profit or not for 
profit). 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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commerce"54 concepts. In 1966, the time was ripe for change. The 
"war on poverty"55 had been met with great public approval, and 
the country was looking for answers to increasing social problems, 
particularly in urban areas.56 Congress recognized that the Act had 
not kept pace with the advancing economy. 57 This failure resulted 
in disproportionately low wages for large groups of workers.58 
Congress enacted the 1966 amendment in an effort to help alleviate 
the circumstances of the working poor and to erase discriminatory 
wage patterns. 59 Thus, by expanding the scope of the Act in the 
1966 amendment, Congress continued to advance the original pur­
pose of the Act as an anti-poverty statute.60 
The creation of a new category61 in the definition of "enter­
prise"62 and "enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production 
of goods for commerce,"63 extended coverage for minimum wage 
54. § l02(c), 80 Stat. at 831-32. The meaning of "enterprise engaged in commerce 
or the production of goods for commerce" was changed, in relevant part, to: "[A]n 
enterprise which has employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for 
commerce, including employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods that 
have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person ...." Id. See supra note 
26 for the text of the 1938 version of the Act which looked to the employees' position 
rather than the nature of the employers' business. 
55. 112 CONGo REc. H11279 (daily ed. May 24, 1966) (statement of Rep. Dent) 
("This [amendment] is an essential effort in our war on poverty."). 
56. See 112 CoNG. REc. H11273 (daily ed. May 24, 1966) (statement of Rep. 
Powell). 
These amendments will also aid in erasing the present discriminatory wage 
patterns. Almost two-thirds of all white workers come within the present cov­
erage provisions, but less than half of all non white workers are covered .... 
1Wo-thirds of all men employed in non-supervisory jobs are covered by the 
Act, but only about half of the women in such jobs. 
Id. 
57. See S. REp. No. 89-1487, at 2 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3002, 
3003. 
58. See id. at 2-3, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3004. 
59. See 112 CoNG. REc. H11273 (daily ed. May 24,1966) (statement of Rep. Pow­
ell); see supra note 56 for a statement by Rep. Powell concerning the reason for the 
1966 amendment. 
60. See 112 CONGo REc. H11275 (daily ed. May 24, 1966) (statement of Rep. 
Dent). 
The philosophy behind the passage of that bill was that by putting more 
money into the hands of the workers, it would create a greater demand for 
goods; and a greater demand for goods would create a greater production; and 
a greater production would create a greater number of jobs. 
Id. 
61. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 102(a), 
(c),80 Stat. 830, 831 (current version at 29 U.S.c. § 203(r), (s) (1994». 
62. § l02(a), 80 Stat. at 831 (current version at 29 u.s.c. § 203(r)(2) (1994». 
63. § l02(c), 80 Stat. at 831-32 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1994». 
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and overtime requirements. As a result of the definitional changes, 
7.2 million additional workers were covered by the FLSA.64 After 
the 1966 amendment, the FLSA covered employees if the employer 
met certain monetary requirements, and the enterprise was one of 
the following: 
[AJ hospital, an institution primarily engaged in the care of the 
sick, the aged, the mentally ill or defective who reside on the 
premises of such institution, a school for mentally or physically 
handicapped or gifted children, an elementary or secondary 
school, or an institution of higher education (regardless of 
whether or not such hospital, institution, or school is public or 
private or operated for profit or not for profit).65 
Thus, the redefinition of enterprise included within its scope ele­
mentary and secondary schools.66 Additionally, the new terms "el­
ementary"67 and "secondary"68 school were defined. These 
changes further expanded the scope of enterprise coverage under 
the Act. 
Opponents of the move to treat elementary and secondary 
schools as covered enterprises expressed the fear that the require­
ment of minimum and overtime wages would burden already finan­
cially strained school systems.69 A second concern surrounded 
what some in Congress felt was the continued potential for the 
elimination of low-skill jobs for entry level or part time workers.1° 
Although the Senate bill did not include elementary and secon­
dary schools in the definition of "enterprise engaged in commerce 
or the production of goods for commerce,"71 the House bill,n 
64. See S. REP. No. 89-1487, at 2 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3002, 
3003. 
65. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966 § 102(c), 80 Stat. at 832 (current 
version at 29 U.S.c. § 203(s) (1994)) (emphasis added). 
66. See id. 
67. § 102(d), 80 Stat. at 832 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 203(v) (1994)) 
('''[e ]lementary school' means a day or residential school which provides elementary 
education, as determined under State law"). 
68. § 102(d), 80 Stat. at 832 (current version at 29 U.S.c. § 203(w) (1994» 
('''[s]econdary school' means a day or residential school which provides secondary edu­
cation, as determined under State law"). 
69. See S. REp. No. 89-1487, at 8 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3002, 
3010. Additionally, some senators questioned the constitutionality of the federal gov­
ernment imposing wage requirements on what was considered a state activity. See id. 
70. See supra note 46 for a discussion of this concern as raised in the 1961 
amendment. 
71. S. REP. No. 89-1487, at 6-7, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3009. 
72. H.R. REp. No. 89-13712, at 1 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3002. 
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which did include elementary and secondary schools, was the ver­
sion Congress ultimately passed,?3 However, no recorded debate 
exists concerning the inclusion of elementary and secondary 
schools. Thus, congressional passage of the House version supports 
the inference that Congress determined that the benefits of ex­
tending the protection of the FLSA to these enterprises outweighed 
the problems associated with extending coverage,?4 Once the en­
terprise concept was expanded, unlimited possibilities for further 
amplification of this concept existed.75 One such amplification oc­
curred in the 1972 amendment to the FLSA. 
D. The Education Amendments of 1972 
As part of its 1972 higher education bill, Congress passed an­
other amendment to the FLSA.76 In this amendment, Congress 
changed the definition of enterprise by adding "preschool" to the 
existing list of activities performed for business purposes,?7 How­
ever, unlike the 1966 amendment, Congress failed to define "pre­
school."78 The congressional record is devoid of reference to why 
Congress included the term "preschool" in the definition of 
enterprise. 
The question of what type of businesses fall within the list of 
covered enterprises under the 1972 addition of "preschool" remains 
subject to judicial interpretation. The courts, in analyzing this prob­
73. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § l02(a), 
(c), 80 Stat. 830, 831-32 (current version at 29 U.S.c. § 203(r)(2), (s) (1994)). 
74. See Reich v. Miss Paula's Day Care Ctr., 37 F.3d 1191, 1193 n.4 (6th Cir. 
1994). 
75. See Willis, supra note 28, at 626 ("It is important to note that there are unlim­
ited possibilities for amplification of the Act's coverage by the judiciary by way of [Sec­
tions 3(r) and 3(s)]."). Another shift that occurred with the 1966 amendments was the 
type of federal litigation brought under the FLSA. See id. Previously, litigation fo­
cused on the employee-centered basis of coverage. See id. With the 1966 amendments, 
litigation shifted to the enterprise coverage concept. See id. 
76. See Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 906(b)(2)-(3), 86 
Stat. 235, 375 (current version at 29 U.S.c. § 203(r), (s) (1994)). 
77. Id. Section 203(r)(1) defines enterprise as: 
"Enterprise" means the related activities performed ... (1) in connection with 
the operation of a hospital, an institution primarily engaged in the care of the 
sick, the aged, mentally ill or defective ... , a school for the mentally or physi­
cally handicapped or gifted children, a preschool, elementary or secondary 
school, or an institution of higher education. 
Id. Section 203(s)(5) also includes the term "preschool." 
78. Compare Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 
§ l02(d), 80 Stat. 830, 832 (1966) (current version at 29 U.S.c. § 203(v), (w) (1994)) 
with Act of June 23, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 906, 86 Stat. 235, 275 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (I), (s)(4) (1994)). 
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lem, have principally employed traditional methods of statutory in­
terpretation.79 Only one court has discussed policy-centered 
considerations.80 This Note asserts that the traditional methods of 
statutory interpretation employed by federal courts in interpreting 
the 1972 amendment to the FLSA are ineffective when, as here, 
conflicting legislative policies emerge to cloud the interpretive 
process. 
II. ApPROACHES TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION USED BY 

FEDERAL COURTS IN INTERPRETING THE 1972 

AMENDMENT TO THE FLSA 

In the past fifty years, and particularly since the 1960s, statu­
tory law has increasingly replaced the common law.81 This height­
ened activity of the legislature has created additional issues to be 
resolved by the judicial branch.82 The increased use of statutes as 
methods of regulation has spurred debate on the proper methods of 
statutory interpretation. 
There are three principal approaches to statutory interpreta­
tion relied upon by federal courts in analyzing the meaning of the 
1972 amendment to the FLSA:83 first, the plain meaning rule which 
79. See infra Part II for a discussion of the three approaches to statutory interpre­
tation used by federal courts in interpreting the 1972 amendment to the FLSA, as well 
as a discussion of a feminist method of interpretation. 
80. See Reich v. Miss Paula's Day Care Ctr., 37 F.3d 1191 (6th Cir. 1994). 
81. See Robert J. Araujo, S.J., The Use of Legislative History in Statutory Inter­
pretation: A Look at Regents v. Bakke, 16 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 57, 63-64 (1992) (ap­
plying a synthetic approach which includes the use of legislative history in interpreting 
Title VI); Justice Ellen Ash Peters, Common Law Judging in a Statutory World: An 
Address,43 U. PITT. L. REV. 995,996 (1982) ("It seems to be indisputable that by the 
end of the century, our legal landscape will be one in which statutes of one kind or 
another will be, not just occasional landmarks, but the dominant feature on the map."). 
82. See Lori L. Outzs, Note, A Principled Use of Congressional Floor Speeches in 
Statutory Interpretation, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 297 (1995) (advocating the use 
of congressional floor speeches in arriving at an interpretation of a statute). 
83. The traditional approaches to statutory interpretation used by federal courts 
in interpreting the 1972 amendment to the FLSA are under criticism by many theorists. 
For instance, Professor Eskridge, in advocating a practical reasoning approach to statu­
tory interpretation, has made several criticisms of the traditional approaches to statu­
tory interpretation. The traditional methods, which Professor Eskridge calls "grand 
theories," suffer common weaknesses: 
First, each rests upon questionable premises about the nature of interpretation 
and the legislative process. Second, none can systematically produce determi­
nate results in the "hard cases," which undermines their claims to "objectiv­
ity." Third, although each theory rests upon and subserves important values 
that should be considered when interpreting statutes, no theory persuades us 
that its cluster of underlying values is so important as to exclude all others. 
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states that the self-evident ineaning of the statute's words takes pre­
cedence as long as an absurd result will not occur;84 second, a textu­
alist approach, which also focuses on the statute's language, but 
allows the interpreter to go beyond the particular provision to view 
the statute as a whole;85 and third, an intentionalist approach which 
examines legislative history in addition to the text to discover Con­
gress's intent in enacting the statute or amendment.86 Courts inter­
preting the FLSA have not adhered to anyone these traditional 
approaches, but have selectively borrowed from each in their analy­
sis of the 1972 amendment. 
This Note discusses briefly the traditional approaches to statu­
tory interpretation underlying the federal courts' analysis in inter­
preting the 1972 amendment to the FLSA, as well as a policy­
centered approach that is founded on a feminist analysis. This Note 
concludes that, in analyzing which businesses are considered 
"preschools" within the meaning of the Act, the approaches used 
by federal courts thus far fail as interpretive tools because they do 
not address the underlying policy tensions evident in the FLSA. 
These policy tensions include the Act's purpose as an anti-poverty 
statute and Congress's reluctance to implement complimentary leg­
islation that would enable the Act's purpose to be effectuated. 
Therefore, alternative methods of statutory interpretation, which 
bring to light the policy tensions within the Act, must be employed. 
A. The Plain Meaning Rule 
Under the plain meaning rule, the particular provision in the 
text itself takes precedence over all else.87 This rule is based on the 
theory that "the best way to ascertain the meaning of statutory lan­
guage is to consider the language of the statute itself."88 The plain 
meaning rule limits the interpretive inquiry to whether interpreta­
tion of the plain meaning of the words in the particular factual con-
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 14, at 322. 
84. See Araujo, supra note 81, at 69; see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 14, 
at 340 (plain meaning posits that "[t]he beginning, and usually the end of statutory 
interpretation should be the apparent meaning of the statutory language." (citation 
omitted)). 
85. See Araujo, supra note 81, at 73. 
86. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 14, at 345. 
87. See Araujo, supra note 81, at 69. "Under the plain meaning doctrine of statu­
tory interpretation, the language of the statute is exclusively examined." Id.; see also 
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 14, at 340. 
88. Araujo, supra note 81, at 70. 
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text would lead to an absurd result.89 'If the plain meaning of the 
words does not lead to an absurd result, the interpretation ends 
there.90 Thus, "the factual context, the surrounding general circum­
stances of the history of the legislative process underlying the stat­
ute's passage, rules of construction, and examination of intent or 
purpose are irrelevant to an individual interpretation of the 
statute."91 
The enticement of the plain meaning rule is its simplicity.92 
The plain meaning rule draws a bright line at the statute's language. 
Thereby, it fails to address the possibility of ambiguity which might 
exist within the statute.93 Advocates of the plain meaning rule fre­
quently use dictionary definitions to arrive at the "plain meaning" 
of a word.94 However, one problem with the rule is that its simplic­
ity often leads to apathy, whereby "judges, in struggling to avoid 
legislative history, have 'found' a plain meaning in the text rather 
than the ambiguity that leads to deference to agencies. "95 Addi­
tionally, the plain meaning rule fails to recognize that the historical 
particularity of the interpreter fundamentally affects her under­
standing of the value and meaning of words.96 Thus, one inherent 
problem with the plain meaning rule is that it does not have, within 
its methodology, a check and balance system that challenges the 
89. See id. at 69. 
90. However, where an absurd result would occur, plain meaning interpreters will 
use other sources. Nevertheless, because plain meaning gives the interpreter great lati­
tude in detennining the plain meaning of a word, these other methods may never be 
utilized. 
91. Araujo, supra note 81, at 71. 
92. See Outzs, supra note 82, at 307 ("Under the plain-meaning rule, one looks 
first to the text. If it is perceived by the judge to be clear, the inquiry ends."); Gene R. 
Shreve, Symmetries ofAccess in Civil Rights Litigation: Politics, Pragmatism & Will, 66 
IND. L.J. 1,7-8 (1990) ("The plain meaning rule, which provides that a statute be inter­
preted according to the plain or ordinary meaning of its language, continues to exert 
influence. "). 
93. See Araujo, supra note 81, at 71-72. 
94. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Labor v. Elledge, 614 F.2d 247, 250 (10th Cir. 
1980). But see Clark D. Cunningham et aI., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE 
L.J. 1561, 1614 (1994) (exploring the ideas raised in LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LAN­
GUAGE OF JUDGES (1993), for example, the idea that linguistic analysis shows that plain 
meaning cannot be found in the dictionary). 
95. Outzs, supra note 82, at 298 (citation omitted). 
96. See Naomi R. Cahn et aI., The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Contempo­
rary Proceedings, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1754, 1759 (1993) (presenting alternative 
analyses to Lon Fuller'S classic article The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. 
L. REV. 616 (1949)). "The meaning of the language of the statute depends on who is 
reading the statute and where she places emphasis as to what different 'plain mean­
ing(s)' will emerge." Id. at 1759. 
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interpreter's basic assumptions.97 
B. The Textualist Theory of Statutory Interpretation 
The textualist theory of statutory interpretation, like the plain 
meaning rule, focuses on the statute and does not consider legisla­
tive history or other sources to resolve conflict or ambiguity.98 
However, unlike the plain meaning rule, a textualist interpretation 
will go beyond the particular provision and look at the entire stat­
ute to arrive at an interpretation.99 
Textualism is distrustful of the use of legislative history in stat­
utory interpretation and the ambiguities it creates.1°o Rather, tex­
tualism views statutes as "'one-time pronouncements of an 
independent Congress, binding so far as they impose a meaning, but 
not instructive, not illuminated either by their political history or by 
the course of their implementation. "'101 
Although more complex in its approach than the plain mean­
ing rule, textualist theory poses a similar problem as the plain 
meaning rule by being overly simplistic, static, and by failing to rec­
ognize that the meaning one gives to words is largely determined by 
context.102 As Professor Eskridge has stated, one inherent problem 
of the textualist method is that "interpretation cannot aspire to uni­
versal objectivity, since the interpreter's perspective will always in­
97. See, e.g., Cahn et aI., supra note 96, at 1759-60. "[W]e must instead recognize 
that law and facts are intertwined, and that how we view the facts is influenced by how 
we view the law." Id. at 1760. 
Another problem with the plain meaning rule is that Congress often intentionally 
leaves a statute's language ambiguous in an effort to include currently unimagined po­
tential applications. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 14, at 347; see also Susan G. 
Fentin, Note, The False Claims Act-Finding Middle Ground Between Opportunity and 
Opportunism: The "Original Source" Provision of 31 U.S.c. § 3730(e) (4) , 17 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REv. 255, 286 (1995) (arguing against the use of the plain meaning rule with 
ambiguous statutes and, instead, advocating the use of fundamental principles of statu­
tory construction to interpret an ambiguous statute). 
98. See Araujo, supra note 81, at 73. 
99. See id. 
100. See Outzs, supra note 82, at 307. The basis for this distrust is twofold. First, 
the use of legislative histories or other sources is seen as violating the democratic sys­
tem established through the doctrine of separation of powers. Second, the use of these 
sources expands the powers of interest groups by emphasizing the deals they made with 
Congress. See id. (citing Nicholas Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of 
Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 
1300-08 (1990)). 
101. Outzs, supra note 82, at 308 (quoting an unpublished manuscript of Peter L. 
Strauss, Fighting the Common Law Function of Courts, 1994 SUP. Cr. REv. 61 (1995)). 
102. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 14, at 342-43. 
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teract with the text and historical context."103 Additionally, 
textualism, like the plain meaning rule, errs in presupposing that 
language is intrinsically determinate.104 
C. The Intentionalist Theory of Statutory Interpretation 
The intentionalist theory of statutory interpretation is based on 
the notion that a statute by nature is more general than specific, 
giving the statute greater effectiveness in a broader range of cir­
cumstances. lOS However, statutes are not enacted in a vacuum. 
Most often, statutes are enacted with a general policy framework.106 
To this end, intentionalism examines the" 'intent of the legislature' 
in enacting the statute."107 Under this view, the court "acts as the 
enacting legislature's faithful servant, discovering and applying the 
legislature's original intent."!08 As an agent of the legislature, the 
court's role is limited to discovering and applying the legislature's 
intent to a particular factual context,l°9 
Various tools may be used by advocates of this position to ad­
dress the issue of Congress's intent, including the legislative his­
tory.110 The use of legislative history is especially necessary in 
determining why a particular word or phrase was added.111 Inten­
tionalism, thus, is limited in effect because it disregards subsequent 
historical developments or the changing societal context.112 How­
ever, intentionalist theory seeks to find what the general intent of 
the legislature was and apply that intent to the situation at hand, 
not to discover the specific intent of particular legislators,u3 
D. A Feminist Theory of Statutory Interpretation 114 
There is no single feminist approach to statutory interpret a­
103. Id. at 343 (citation omitted). 
104. See id. at 341. Professor Eskridge suggests that the nature of language as 
determinate or indeterminate is a point of departure among theorists. To highlight the 
debate he discusses the multiple layers of meaning in the word "discrimination." 
105. See Araujo, supra note 81, at 85. "By necessity, statutes, in order to remain 
operational and effective, must be general and must retain flexibility in their language 
so they can address any unforeseen circumstances." Id. 
106. See id. 
107. Id. at 81. 
108: Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 14, at 325. 
109. See id. at 325-26. 
110. See Outzs, supra note 82, at 309. 
111. See id. at 309. 
112. See id. at 310. 
113. See id. 
114. There are other methods of statutory interpretation that might also reveal 
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tion.115 In fact, as Professor Bartlett points out, suggesting a 
uniquely feminist interpretive method is inherently problematic. 
"[The] use of the label 'feminist' has contributed to a tendency 
within feminism to assume a definition of 'woman' or a standard for 
'women's experiences' that is fixed, exclusionary, homogenizing, 
and oppositional, a tendency that feminists have criticized in 
others."1l6 However, one characteristic common to a feminist ap­
proach to statutory interpretation, unlike the traditional ap­
proaches, is that "[f]eminists have called attention to the 
importance of identifying and using traditionally obscured perspec­
tives to expose hidden bias and to develop new interpretations. "117 
For instance, feminists have challenged the presumption that 
the judicial role in statutory interpretation is or can be neutral.118 
In particular, as Professor Resnik has noted, the feminist critique 
often begins with the notion that courts have employed the tradi­
tional methods of statutory interpretation under a misguided notion 
of judicial objectivity.119 Feminists have challenged the classical 
view of a judicial role where" 'judges are not supposed to have an 
involvement or interest in the controversies they adjudicate. Disen­
gagement and dispassion supposedly enable judges to decide cases 
fairly and impartially. "'120 Rather, feminist analysis suggests that in 
practice disengagement is not followed, and that in theory the tradi­
tional view of statutory interpretation is not something to which we 
should aspire.121 A feminist theory of statutory interpretation re-
the policy tensions evident in the Act. See, for example, Eskridge & Frickey, supra 
note 14, for other theories of statutory interpretation that might reveal the policy 
tensions evident in the FLSA. See infra Part III.D for a more thorough discussion of 
the relevance of a feminist policy-centered analysis to the issue of interpreting the 1972 
amendment to the FLSA. 
115. See Cahn et aI., supra note 96, at 1756; see also A. Yasmine Rassam, 
"Mother," "Parent," and Bias, 69 IND. L.J. 1165 (1994) ("Contemporary scholars do not 
share a single ideological approach to feminist jurisprudence." (citations omitted». 
116. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 834 
(1990) (citation omitted). In this article, Professor Bartlett establishes the feminist 
stance of positionality and advocates that feminist methods are ends in themselves. See 
id. 
117. Cahn et aI., supra note 96, at 1757. 
118. See generally Judith Resnik, On the Bias; Feminist Reconsiderations of the 
Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1877 (1988) (advocating that the classi­
cal theory that judges are to be unbiased, impartial, and objective is not theoretically or 
practically precise). 
119. See id. at 1882. 
120. Id. (quoting Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376 
(1982». 
121. See id. 
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places this traditional view of the judicial role as the objective inter­
preter with the notion that the interpreter necessarily has 
involvement in the issues. Thus, once we understand that there is 
no position of objectivity, but only a series of perspectives, we learn 
that "[t]here is no neutrality, no escape from choice."122 
Therefore, feminist approaches to statutory interpretation 
principally challenge the notion of the objectivity of the inter­
preter.123 Feminist methods suggest that judges, because of their 
particular race, gender, and economic circumstances, interpret stat­
utes from a very specific "lens" that should be acknowledged.124 In 
this way, feminist legal scholars argue that language, and thus 
meaning, is constructed and is not an objective truth one can simply 
uncover.125 Thus, interpretation of a statute from a feminist per­
spective might allow the experience of exclusion to influence the 
analysis. Using the experience of exclusion, a feminist analysis may 
simply but fundamentally alter the starting point of the interpreta­
tion of a statute. 
A feminist analysis is particularly relevant to the statutory in­
terpretation of which businesses are defined as "preschools" and, 
therefore, required to comply with the FLSA. The feminist ap­
proach is relevant to determine which businesses fall within the def­
inition of "preschool" because it involves two areas that have been 
traditionally dominated by women, and which disproportionately 
affect women's opportunities to participate equally in the economy. 
Specifically, the labor force for day care centers and "preschools" is 
predominately composed of women,126 and the affordability of day 
care disproportionately affects all womens' ability to work outside 
122. Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engen­
dered, 101 HARv. L. REv. 10, 70 (1987) (advocating that the illusion of objectivity is 
effectively threatening the prospect of justice). 
123. See generally id. at 57; Rassam, supra note 115, at 1170-73. 
124. See generally Resnik, supra note 118, at 1906. 
125. See Bartlett, supra note 116, at 849. Other legal scholars have also criticized 
the notion that language can be "plain" in its meaning. See Rassam, supra note 115, at 
1169-71. But see Christian Zapf & Eben Moglen, Linguistic Indeterminacy and the Rule 
of Law: On the Perils of Misunderstanding Wittgenstein, 84 GEO. L.J. 485, 485 (1996) 
(asserting that the advocates of linguistic indeterminacy are wrong in their reliance on 
Wittgenstein to support their position). 
126. In 1995, the number of child care workers (undefined) that were women was 
223,000, compared to 20,000 men. Also in 1995, the number of pre-kindergarten and 
kindergarten teachers that were women was 489,000, compared to 9,000 men. See Bu­
reau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor, Employed & Experienced Unemployed Per­
sons Detailed by Occupation, Sex, Race & Hispanic Origin, Annual Average, 1995, 
tbl.1 (1995) (unpublished tables) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bureau of Labor 
Statistics]; see also William Goodman, Boom in Day Care Industry the Result of Many 
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the home.127 Thus, a feminist analysis, because it uses the experi­
ence of exclusion in its interpretation, provides a starting point for 
departure from the three traditional approaches to statutory inter­
pretation employed by federal courts in interpreting the 1972 
amendment to the FLSA. 
Confronting the vague and ambiguous 1972 amendment to the 
FLSA, federal courts have struggled to decide whether centers that 
care for children under the age that children traditionally enter 
school are required to comply with the FLSA's wage and hour re­
quirements. In this effort, the courts have used traditional methods 
of statutory interpretation borrowing from the plain meaning 
rule,128 textualism129 and intentionalism130 to interpret the 1972 
amendment to the FLSA. However, no court exclusively uses one 
approach to statutory interpretation. Instead, each court combines 
these approaches, shifting from one to another to arrive at its con­
clusion. In the following section, this Note will discuss the ap­
proaches courts employ to interpret the 1972 amendment to the 
FLSA. 
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF WHETHER A CHILD DAY CARE 





A. 	 The Fair Labor Standards Act Does Not Apply to Child Day 
Care Centers: Marshall v. Rosemont, Inc.131 
The Secretary of Labor, in Marshall v. Rosemont, Inc., brought 
two actions pursuant to his power under the FLSA132 to enjoin two 
day care centers from violating the minimum wage and maximum 
Social Changes, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Aug. 1995, at 3 (discussing various social changes 
that have resulted in the need for increased day care providers). 
127. For instance, a study of 158,000 AFDC recipients in Illinois found that 91 % 
of parents who were not working would prefer to be working if they had child care that 
they liked and trusted. See ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AID, CHILD CARE: 
AFDC RECIPIENTS IN ILLINOIS (1991) [hereinafter ILLINOIS DEP'T OF PUBLIC AID RE­
PORT]; see also Catherine L. Fisk, Employer-Provided Child Care Under Title VII: To­
ward an Employer's Duty to Accommodate Child Care Responsibilities of Employees, 2 
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 89 (1986) ("Motherhood ... is ... one of the most persis­
tent impediments to economic equality for women .... [Women] experience a variety of 
adverse employment consequences because of their conflicting responsibilities to their 
children. "). 
128. 	 See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the plain meaning rule. 
129. 	 See supra Part II.B for a discussion of textualism. 
130. 	 See supra Part II.C for a discussion of intentionalism. 
131. 	 584 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1978). 
132. 	 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1994). 
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hour provisions of the Act,133 In one center the children ranged in 
age from infancy to kindergarten. In the other center, the children 
ranged from infancy to third grade.134 The Secretary claimed the 
enterprises at issue were "preschools" within the definition of cov­
ered enterprises.135 In support of this assertion, the Secretary relied 
upon a Wage and Hour Opinion Letter136 that, in the absence of 
congressional direction, defined the term "preschool" broadly.137 
The district court held that neither of the defendant's day care cen­
ters were operating a preschool within the meaning of the Act and 
both complaints were dismissed.138 The Secretary of Labor 
appealed.139 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af­
firmed the district court's decision.140 Relying on textualist meth­
ods of interpretation, the Ninth Circuit first looked to the statute 
and analyzed the word "preschool" within the context of the defini­
tion of enterprise.141 The court recognized that Congress, in devel­
oping the particular types of institutions within the Act, added 
"preschool" to a long list of other types of schools.142 The court 
concluded that Congress, therefore, used the term "preschool" to 
133. See Rosemont, 584 F.2d at 320. 
134. See id. 
135. See id. 
136. This is an administrative ruling promulgated by the Wages-Hours Adminis­
trator. Opinion letters are written under a variety of circumstances. In this case, the 
letter was a response to a resolution to clarify the Wages-Hours law (the Chief of the 
Branch of Coverage and Exemptions in the Wage and Hour Division proposed this 
resolution). See Opinion Letter of the Wage-Hour Administrator, No. 1346, [June 
1973-Sept. 1978 Transfer Binder, Wages-Hours Administrative Rulings] Lab. L. Rep. 
(CCH) 'II 30,953 (October 24, 1974) [hereinafter Opinion Letter No. 1346]. 
137. See id. This letter discusses the history of the FLSA, in particular the legisla­
tive activity leading to the inclusion of "preschool." Coverage was extended to include 
"preschool" regardless of the dollar volume of business or their public or private na­
ture, so long as it has employees engaged in commerce, or the production of goods for 
commerce. See id. Additionally, the letter defined the term "preschool" as including: 
[A]ny establishment or institution which accepts for enrollment children of 
preschool age for purposes of providing custodial, educational, or develop­
mental services designed to prepare the children for school in the years before 
they enter the elementary school grades. This includes day care centers, nurs­
ery schools, kindergartens, head start programs and any similar facility primar­
ily engaged in the care and protection of preschool children. 
Id. 
138. See Rosemont, 584 F.2d at 320. 
139. See id. 
140. See id. at 322. 
141. See id. at 321. 
142. See id. 
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mean an enterprise that is part of the school system.143 Thus, in 
interpreting the Act, the Ninth Circuit focused upon the educa­
tional nature of a "preschool."144 By inference, child day care cen­
ters were thus custodial in nature. 
Again relying on textualist methods of interpretation, the court 
also reviewed Congress's definitions of "elementary" and "secon­
dary" school, which were covered under the same provision in the 
ACt.145 Because the Act defers to state law in the definition of ele­
mentary and secondary schools,l46 the court concluded that state 
law was relevant in determining whether a child day care center was 
a "preschool" within the meaning of the 1972 amendment.147 Thus, 
because the day care centers were not regulated by the state of Ari­
zona, and because the Secretary did not present any conclusive evi­
dence that these institutions should be considered an enterprise, the 
court held that the FLSA did not apply to these day care centers.148 
143. See id. "Of 'schools' [the Act] lists schools for 'handicapped or gifted chil­
dren'; it then proceeds to 'a preschool, elementary or secondary school, or institution of 
higher education.'" [d. 
144. See id. 
145. See id. at 320-21. 
146. See id.; see also Smith v. Friends of Children, 616 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Miss. 
1985). The Smith court advocated a similar reasoning as the court in Rosemont: Since 
within the Act deference is given to state law in defining "elementary" and "secondary" 
school, because the Act defers to state law in defining each term, by inference, state law 
is determinative in defining "preschool." See id. at 183. See supra notes 67 and 68 for 
the definitions of "elementary" and "secondary" schools. Thus, since the Head Start 
program was not certified by the State Department of Education, the court held that it 
was not operating a preschool within the meaning of the FLSA. See Smith, 616 F. Supp. 
at 183. 
147. See Rosemont, 584 F.2d at 321. Similarly, in Satya! v. Shah, 756 F. Supp. 937 
(E.D. Va. 1991), the plaintiff, a live-in day care worker, filed suit seeking minimum 
wage and overtime pay under the FLSA. See id. at 938. The Satya! court, like the court 
in Rosemont, concluded that the day care center was not an enterprise covered under 
the Act. See id. at 941. As did the court in Rosemont, the Satya! court reviewed the 
statute's treatment of "elementary" and "secondary" schools. The court held that the 
FLSA deferred to state law concerning the definition of "elementary" and "secondary" 
schools but failed to do this with "preschool." The Satya! court, however, unlike the 
court in Rosemont, concluded that state law should not be the point of distinction, be­
cause Congress chose to omit any reference to state law and presumably would have 
included such a reference had it been important. See id. at 939. 
148. See Rosemont, 584 F.2d at 321-22. 
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1. 	 United States Department of Labor v. Elledge 149 
In United States Department of Labor v. Elledge, the Secretary 
of Labor appealed a judgment by the lower court holding that the 
day care center was not a "preschool" within the meaning of the 
Act.150 The "Young Sooners Day Care Center" was open to chil­
dren ranging in age from infancy to twelve years.151 Sixty-two per­
cent of the children were three to five years 01d.152 The center 
transported children of school age to and from their schools and 
provided them with games, toys, activities, books, and food for 
snacks and meals while at the center. The center provided the same 
sort of activities for the children who were not school age with the 
addition of naps.153 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit first 
relied on intentionalist methods of statutory interpretation to ana­
lyze the meaning of "preschool" within the Act by reviewing the 
history of the FLSA, and particularly the evolution of the definition 
of "enterprise" and the definitions of "elementary" and "secon­
dary" schools.154 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the legislative 
history leading to the 19?2 amendment was unhelpful.155 Turning 
then to Oklahoma law, the court recognized that the state had li­
censed the center as a "day care center."156 Under this Oklahoma 
statute, a day care center was defined as a "'facility which provides 
care and protection of six or more children for part of the twenty­
four hour day."'157 Additionally, the statute excluded from its 
149. 	 614 F.2d 247 (10th Cir. 1980). 
150. See id. at 248. The Secretary of Labor instituted the action for declaratory 
judgment on the issue of whether the enterprise was a preschool covered under the 
FLSA. See id. 
151. 	 Id. 
152. See id. No statistics were given for the age breakdown of the other 38% of 
the children. 
153. 	 See id. at 249. 
154. See id. See supra notes 67 and 68 for the definition of "elementary" and 
"secondary" school. 
155. See Elledge, 614 F.2d at 249. The court found that the only reference to the 
1972 amendment was in H.R. REP. No. 92-1085, at 2 (1972), reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462, 2567. This merely notes the addition of" 'preschool' to the existing 
listing of 'an elementary or secondary school' as types of activities performed for busi­
ness purposes." Elledge, 614 F.2d at 249. 
156. 	 See Elledge, 614 F.2d at 249. 
157. 	 Id. (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 402(d) (no date provided by the court)). 
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scope all facilities that were educational in purpose.15S These ex­
cluded facilities which were registered through the state board of 
education, included nursery schools, kindergartens, elementary, and 
secondary schools.159 
The court in Elledge rejected the conclusion in Rosemont that 
a "preschool" should be distinguished from a day care center on the 
grounds that the former serves a primarily educational function 
while the latter provides only a function of custodial care.160 The 
Elledge court held that this was an artificial distinction, because the 
relevant section of the FLSA relates to enterprises with primarily a 
custodial function as well as those with primarily an educational 
function. 161 As additional support for this conclusion, the Tenth 
Circuit turned to an earlier Tenth Circuit decision, McComb v. 
Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. 162 In McComb, the court held 
that the FLSA "is not expanded to include some employees and 
limited to exclude others engaged in the same work, depending 
upon local statutory or judicial concepts. "163 The Tenth Circuit 
held that this principle is controlling unless Congress makes state 
law applicable.164 Thus, the Tenth Circuit highlighted one of the 
original purposes of the Act: to provide uniformity in the treatment 
of workers.165 
158. See id. 
159. See id. 
160. See id. at 249-50. 
161. See id. at 250. 
162. 167 F.2d 911. modified and afrd, 337 U.S. 755 (1949). In McComb, the 
Tenth Circuit addressed whether all of the defendant's employees, except one, were 
engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce under the agriculture 
provisions of the Act. See id. at 912. The action in McComb was brought before the 
"enterprise concept" was introduced into the Act. Thus, the Secretary had to prove 
that each employee was engaged in commerce or the production of goods for com­
merce. In this context, the court concluded that "local law relating to the imposition of 
special assessments or the levying of ad valorem taxes is not the test for determining 
whether the employees of such a corporation are engaged in agriculture within the 
meaning of [the] section." Id. at 915. To do this would be to "introduce [as many] 
variations ... as the laws of the several states." Id. The court, therefore, concluded 
that under the Act, "[p]ersons engaged in identical work [cannot] be within the statute 
or exempt from its provisions depending upon the location of their work and the atti­
tude of the particular state." Id. See supra note 26 for the text of the 1938 version of 29 
U.S.c. § 206(a)(I)-(3) (1994); see also supra Part I.A for a discussion of the 1938 enact­
ment of the FLSA. 
163. McComb, 167 F.2d at 915 (citing National Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst 
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. III (1944». 
164. See Elledge, 614 F.2d at 250. 
165. See supra Part I.A for a thorough discussion of Congress's intent in enacting 
the FLSA. 
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Shifting to the text, the court analyzed the Act's deference to 
state law in the definitions of "elementary" and "secondary" school 
relative to the absence of state law in defining "preschool."166 The 
Tenth Circuit, in contrast to Rosemont, held that because Congress 
specifically allows states to substantively define "elementary" and 
"secondary" school,167 and conversely fails to refer to state law with 
"preschool," Congress intended to treat "preschools" differently.168 
N ext, the court employed the plain meaning rule and reasoned 
that, in the absence of direction from Congress and in the absence 
of legislative history, "'it is appropriate for the court to interpret 
[preschool] in accordance with its ordinary, everyday meaning."'169 
The court then turned to Webster's definition of "preschool," which 
was defined as "'a kindergarten or nursery school where children of 
preschool age, sometimes in age groups, are entered for observa­
tion and social and educational training."'17o The court noted that 
this definition was consistent with a Wage and Hour Opinion Letter 
issued by the Department of Labor, which does not make a distinc­
tion between the custodial and educational functions of "preschool" 
and day care centers,171 
The Tenth Circuit, in concluding that the "Young Sooners Day 
Care Center" was a covered enterprise under the Act,l72 cited the 
remedial and humanitarian intent of the Act as addressing the det­
rimental circumstances of many workers.173 The Tenth Circuit 
noted that the Act, as a remedial and humanitarian statute, has 
been interpreted to reach the furthest coverage "'consistent with 
congressional direction."'174 Similarly, to effectuate its remedial 
166. See Elledge, 614 F.2d at 250. 
167. See supra notes 67 and 68 for the definitions of "elementary" and "secon­
dary" schools under the FLSA. 
168. See Elledge, 614 F.2d at 250. 
169. Id. (quoting United States v. New Mexico, 536 F.2d 1324, 1327-28 (10th Cir. 
1976)). 
170. Elledge, 614 F.2d at 250 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DIC­
TIONARY (2d ed.) (no date provided by the court)). 
171. See id. at 251; see supra note 137 for the text of the letter. 
172. Elledge, 614 F.2d at 251. 
173. See id.; see also Hodgson v. University Club Tower, Inc., 466 F.2d 745, 746 
(10th Cir. 1972) (indicating that the FLSA was passed for humanitarian and remedial 
purposes). The Act itself lends this interpretation. Section 216 of the Act provides 
penalties for knowing violations of the Act. See 29 U.S.c. § 216 (1994). This demon­
strates the Act's remedial nature. Additionally, the humanitarian purpose is clearly 
stated in the declared policy of the Act to "correct and as rapidly as practicable to 
eliminate the conditions above referred to in such industries without substantially cur­
tailing employment or earning power." 29 U.S.c. § 202(b) (1994). 
174. Elledge, 614 F.2d at 251 (quoting Mitchell v. Lubin, McGaughy & Assoc., 
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and humanitarian purpose, the Act's breadth of coverage has his­
torically been viewed as vital to the Act's mission,175 Thus, the 
Tenth Circuit reasoned that categorizing the plaintiff's day care 
center as a "preschool" is consistent not only with Congress's intent 
with regard to the 1972 amendment, but also with the Act as a 
whole.176 
2. Reich v. Miss Paula's Day Care Center177 
In Reich v. Miss Paula's Day Care Center, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also addressed the issue of 
when afacility that cares for children below the compulsory school 
age becomes a "preschool" within the meaning of the Act,178 Miss 
Paula's Day Care Center provided custodial care in the Appalach­
ian region of southeastern Ohio for over sixty children ranging in 
age from infants to six year 01ds,179 Even though Ohio has a sepa­
rate license for "preschool," the center had never sought this li­
cense,180 but had been a state-licensed day care center since 1985.181 
The district court, rejecting the center's argument that the distinc­
tion between a day care center and "preschool" lies in the nature of 
the institution,182 held that the center came within the meaning of 
the Act because the common sense definition of a "preschool" in­
cludes a day care center.183 The center appealed.184 
The Sixth Circuit looked to the language of the statute as well 
as the surrounding provisions concerning the definition of "elemen­
tary" and "secondary" schoo1.185 The court interpreted the 1972 
amendment, which included "preschool" in the list of covered en­
358 U.S. 207, 211 (1959) (holding that the Act should be liberally construed to its fur­
thest reaches, consistent with congressional direction». 
175. See id. (citing Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 516 
(1950». 
176. See id. 
177. 37 F.3d 1191 (6th Cir. 1994). 
178. See id. at 1192. 
179. See id. 
180. See id.; see OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.646 (Banks-Baldwin 1994). "Pre­
school program" is defined as "a child day care program for preschool children." 
§ 3301.52(A). 
181. See Miss Paula's, 37 F.3d at 1192. The center was licensed under OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. §§ 5104.01-.03 (Banks-Baldwin 1984). 
182. See Miss Paula's, 37 F.3d at 1195. To this end, the center argued that day 
care centers are primarily .custodial, and "preschools," as the name suggests, are primar­
ily educational. See id. 
183. See id. 
184. See id. at 1192. 
185. See id. at 1193-94. 
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terprises, within the context of the 1966 amendment which ex­
panded the "enterprise concept."186 The court noted that in 
amending the FLSA in 1966 to include elementary and secondary 
schools as covered enterprises, Congress expressed concern over 
the impact an increase in wages would have on school district budg­
ets.187 However, despite this concern, Congress included elemen­
tary and secondary schools as covered enterprises under the Act. 
From these historical facts, the court inferred that Congress know­
ingly decided that the extension of the FLSA to these employees 
outweighed the financial burden it would impose on the school sys­
tems.188 The court held that it was reasonable to infer from the 
House Report that "'preschool[s]'" were added to the Act because 
of the economic characteristics they share with elementary and sec­
ondary schools.189 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit held that the finan­
cial strains of compliance with the Act were not intended by 
Congress to be considered in determining coverage under the 
Act.190 Despite this analysis, the court ultimately concluded that 
the legislative history was unhelpful in interpreting the 1972 
amendment.191 
The Sixth Circuit next recognized the distinction that other 
courts, based on the text of the statute, had made between the sup­
posed custodial nature of day care centers and the educational na­
ture of "preschools."192 The Sixth Circuit, however, held that this 
was a strained reading of the statute because the Act included tradi­
tionally custodial institutions, such as hospitals, as well as tradition­
ally educational institutions like secondary schools.193 
The Sixth Circuit employed the plain meaning rule to reach its 
conclusion that the center was a "preschool" within the meaning of 
the Act.194 The court held that it was reasonable that Congress did 
not provide for "child day care centers" separately, because it re­
186. See id. at 1194. 
187. See id. at 1193 n.4 (citing S. REp. No. 89-1487, at 8 (1966), reprinted in 1966 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3002, 3010). 
188. See id. 
189. Id. at 1194 (citing H.R. REP. No. 92-554, at 5-6 (1972), reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462, 2567). 
190. See id. at 1193. 
191. See id. 
192. See id. at 1194-95. This had been the center's primary support for its argu­
ment that it should not fall within the FLSA's umbrella. See also Marshall v. 
Rosemont, 584 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1978). 
193. See Miss Paula's, 37 F.3d at 1195. The court noted this reading assumes 
more than the statute's words suggest. See id. 
194. See id. 
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garded them in their common language meaning as serving any 
child who is before or "pre" school age.195 Additionally, the court 
held that even under a state law definition, the "plain meaning" of 
"preschool" would include child day care centers like Miss Paula's, 
because even though the state of Ohio licenses "preschools" and 
"day care centers" differently, Ohio's definition of preschools in­
cludes "day care" programs.196 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit held 
that even if Miss Paula's could show it provided no education to the 
children and was merely a custodial center, Miss Paula's would still 
be obligated to comply with the FLSA because the statute includes 
purely custodial institutions.197 
The Sixth Circuit was reluctant to end its inquiry with the stat­
utory interpretation of the 1972 amendment. Rather, the court 
noted the conflict in policies when it recognized that the facts of the 
case were disturbing because Miss Paula's provided educational en­
richment to low-income children while their parents were produc­
tive members of the work force. 198 The Sixth Circuit further noted 
that, as the facts indicated, the requirements of the FLSA placed a 
severe burden on Miss Paula's and thus on the childrens' parents.199 
Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit inferred that even though this deci­
sion may have an adverse effect, if it is the government's social pol­
icy to eliminate low wage operations, the court was not allowed to 
stand in its way, for this was a legislative and not a judicial func­
tion.2DD As further support for this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit 
commented that to exempt day care centers from the FLSA's mini­
mum wage and overtime provisions would be to encourage centers 
to "dumb down" their programs in an effort to avoid the extra fi­
nancial burden.2Dl 
195. Id. 
196. Id. This was the magistrate judge's interpretation of this part of Ohio's stat­
ute, which the court accepted. See id.; see supra notes 180 and 181 for citation to 
Ohio's statutes. 
197. See Miss Paula's, 37 F.3d at 1196. The court noted the precarious position of 
. the center. 	At one end of the Act, educational institutions are required to comply, and 
at the other end, purely custodial profeSSional babysitting services must also comply. 
See id.; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207 (1994) for exemptions of casual babysitting 
services. 
198. See Miss Paula's, 37 F.3d at 1197. 
199. See id. 
200. See id. Additionally, the court noted that it may be Congress's intent to 
eliminate low-cost operations like Miss Paula's. See id. . 
201. See id. 
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IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Defining the scope of coverage under the FLSA has been a 
fundamental point of legislative and judicial disagreement since the 
Act's inception.202 As the courts in Miss Paula's, Elledge, and 
Rosemont concluded, the legislative history of the 1972 amend­
ment, which added "preschool" to the list of covered enterprises, 
was unhelpful in determining the scope of coverage under the 1972 
amendment.203 Senate and House Reports, as well as the Congres­
sional Record, are frustratingly void of reference to Congress's rea­
soning in amending the FLSA to include "preschool" in its 
treatment of covered enterprises.204 . 
The only insight into congressional intent in amending the 
FLSA to include "preschool" is in the language of the 1972 amend­
ment itself. However, that amendment simply adds "preschool" to 
the existing list of "activities performed for business purposes."205 
Therefore, because the definition of "preschool" is left without leg­
islative direction, the courts charged with defining its import have 
employed a variety of interpretive methods. 
In interpreting the 1972 amendment, the courts have used 
traditional approaches to statutory interpretation. These ap­
proaches include the plain meaning rule, and methods consistent 
with intentionalism and textualism. No court uses one approach ex­
clusively. Instead, each court combines different approaches to ar­
rive at its conclusion. Additionally, no court has substantively 
considered the policy of the Act as an anti-poverty provision. In­
stead, the only court to address policy issues concluded that consid­
eration of public policy issues was not a judicial function.206 
This analysis will address the difficulties courts have faced in 
interpreting the 1972 amendment to the FLSA. This Note asserts 
202. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (holding that the 1961 amend· 
ment introducing the "enterprise" concept is constitutional), overruled on other grounds 
by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Walling v. Jacksonville 
Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564 (1943) (holding the FLSA's Commerce Clause base to be con· 
stitutional); see also Willis, supra note 28, at 609 (commenting that although the FLSA 
has been in existence since 1938, and most of its terms are clear, litigation concerning 
coverage continued to be greater than any other labor law well into the 1970s). 
203. See Miss Paula's, 37 F.3d at 1193; United States Dep't of Labor v. Elledge, 
614 F.2d 247, 249 (10th Cir. 1980); Marshall v. Rosemont, 584 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 
1978). 
204. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 92-554, at 5-6 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.AN. 
2462,2467. 
205. Id. at 1, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2462. 
206. See Miss Paula's, 37 F.3d at 1197. For a more thorough discussion of Miss 
Paula's, see supra Part II1.B.2. 
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that the traditional approaches employed by federal courts in inter­
preting the 1972 amendment to the FLSA fail under the weight of 
an issue that is inextricably entwined with public policy. Further, 
the approaches to interpretation used by the federal courts, without 
consideration of public policy issues, allow justification of decisions 
based on reasons unrelated to the purpose of the statute. Thus, the 
interpretive methods used by federal courts neither provide effi­
cient and consistent analysis, nor substantively address inconsisten­
cies within the Act. 
After examining the courts' methods of interpreting the 1972 
amendment, this Note concludes that a policy-centered method is 
the only effective analysis for courts to employ.207 A feminist pol­
icy-centered method highlights how traditional methods have failed 
to address the adverse impact on low-income women that results 
from either a broad or narrow interpretation of the 1972 amend­
ment to the FLSA. Thus, this feminist analysis forms the starting 
point of a policy-centered analysis. Further, a policy-centered anal­
ysis, founded on feminist concerns, leads to greater judicial honesty 
concerning the nature of the problems that emerge in interpreting 
the 1972 amendment to the FLSA. 
This Note advocates that courts should not disregard policy as 
beyond the purview of the judiciary. Instead, courts should weigh 
the public policy issues in order to fill the legislative void left by 
Congress when it failed to define "preschool" in the 1972 amend­
ment to the FLSA. Furthermore, courts should practice judicial 
honesty and, where the Act's omissions result in injustice, discuss 
policy in their opinions. This Note concludes that what the Sixth 
Circuit in Miss Paula's deemed beyond the role of the judiciary, is 
fundamental to the proper administration of justice. 
A. The Plain Meaning of "Preschool" is Inconclusive 
The court in Miss Paula's and Elledge employed the plain 
meaning rule in their interpretation of the 1972 amendment.208 In 
207. While other analytical methods of statutory construction consider policy is­
sues, this Note advocates a policy-centered analysis, founded on feminist concerns. A 
practical reasoning method of statutory interpretation would employ the policy of the 
Act in its interpretive process. For a thorough discussion of practical reasoning, see 
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 14; see also Michael D. Blanchard, Note, Interpreting 
Section 541(a) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 
1992: A Presumption in Favor ofPractical Reason, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 437, 458-85 
(1996). 
208. See Miss Paula's, 37 F.3d at 1195; Elledge, 614 F.2d at 250; see also supra 
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Elledge, the Tenth Circuit relied on the plain meaning rule after 
exhausting other interpretive methods.209 Using the plain meaning 
rule as a method of last resort suggests that the court found a plain 
meaning in the text rather than addressing the ambiguity of the 
text.210 
As support for its "plain meaning" that a child day care center 
is a "preschool" within the meaning of the Act, the court in Elledge 
relied on the dictionary.211 The court used Webster's New Interna­
tional Dictionary, second edition ("Webster's"), as clear support for 
its position.212 In Webster's, preschool is defined as "'a kindergar­
ten or nursery school where children of preschool age, sometimes in 
age groups, are entered for observation and social and educational 
training."'213 
The problem with using a dictionary as a source for the plain 
meaning of a word is that it does not define the term according to 
the statute, but instead defines the term according to one particular 
usage of a word. For instance, had the court in Elledge used the 
American Heritage Dictionary, second edition, the definition would 
have read: "Of, pertaining to, or designed for a child of nursery­
school age. "214 This definition, unlike that of Webster's, does not 
support the court's conclusion. Thus, although appearing self-evi­
dent, the court's use of the plain meaning rule in Elledge gives the 
false impression that the statute has one clear meaning.215 
Similarly, the court in Miss Paula's employed the plain mean­
ing rule when it held that the absence of a statutory definition for 
"preschool" may be the result of Congress considering day care 
centers as part of the" 'preschool' rubric."216 Thus, the court in-
Part Il.A for a discussion of the plain meaning rule; Shreve, supra note 92, at 7-8 (the 
plain meaning rule continues to exert influence over judicial decisionmaking). 
209. See Elledge, 614 F.2d at 250 (the Tenth Circuit first employed a textualist 
method of interpretation and turned to a plain meaning method after concluding the 
textualist method was inconclusive). 
210. See Outzs, supra note 82, at 298 (citing Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme 
Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Ad­
ministrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (1995». Furthermore, the court's use of the 
plain meaning rule at the end of its analysis shows that it artificially imposed a plain 
meaning on a statute that really was ambiguous. See id. 
211. See Elledge, 614 F.2d at 250. 
212. See id. 
213. Id. (no citation to Webster's New International Dictionary, second edition, 
was provided by the court). 
214. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 542 (2d ed. 1983). 
215. See Cunningham et aI., supra note 94, at 1614-17 (suggesting that linguistic 
analysis shows why "plain meaning" cannot be found in the dictionary). 
216. Reich v. Miss Paula's Day Care Ctr., 37 F.3d 1191, 1195 (6th Cir. 1994). 
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ferred that the preschool rubric was clear. However, this interpre­
tation of the plain meaning of "preschool" is likewise inconclusive 
because it begs the question and fails to address the ambiguity in 
the term.217 
For instance, rather than seeing day care centers as part of the 
"'preschool' rubric," it is equally plausible that, in 1972, Congress 
did not address the issue of whether a child day care center was to 
be considered a "preschool," because Congress either was not 
aware of the distinction, or the distinction did not exist because day 
care centers were not common. Thus, a modern interpreter might 
be similarly unaware of the distinction between preschools and day 
care centers. Therefore, the "plain meaning" of "preschool" could 
suggest a more literal interpretation, applying only to enterprises 
with the word "preschool" in the name. 
In interpreting the meaning of "preschool," use of the plain 
meaning rule allows the interpreter to rest upon her presumptions, 
rather than forcing her to challenge them. These presumptions are 
problematic because, as Professor Resnik suggests, "what has been 
assumed (by some) as a universal viewpoint is, in fact, a viewpoint 
of some men, who have articulated a vision of reality and claimed it 
to be true for us all."218 Thus, the plain meaning rule is ultimately 
inconclusive in interpreting which businesses are considered to be a 
"preschool" within the meaning of the Act. 
B. The Use of Textualism is Ineffectual 
In interpreting the meaning of "preschool" in the 1972 amend­
ment to the FLSA, courts most extensively relied upon methods 
consistent with textualism.219 In Rosemont, the Ninth Circuit em­
ployed a textualist method in two ways. First, the court reviewed 
where the word "preschool" was introduced in the relevant sections 
of the Act.220 Noting that "preschool" was among a list of other 
types of schools, the court in Rosemont concluded that a "pre­
217. For instance, if day care centers were part of everyday experience, then the 
absence of the inclusion of "day care center" would lead to the conclusion that Con­
gress did not intend to include day care centers as covered under the 1972 amendment 
to the FLSA. By contrast, if day care centers were not common in 1972, Congress 
reasonably would not have known of them, so the absence of day care centers in the 
1972 amendment would not mean that Congress did not intend to include them. 
218. Resnik, supra note 118, at 1906. 
219. See supra Part n.B for a discussion of the textualist theory of statutory 
interpretation. 
220. See Marshall v. Rosemont, 584 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1978). 
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school" is a part of the school system.221 Second, upon deciding 
that a preschool is part of the school system, the court looked to the 
definitions of "elementary" and "secondary" school.222 Finding 
that in these definitions the Act deferred to state law, the court 
concluded that state law is also determinative in interpreting a 
"preschool. "223 
The Tenth Circuit in Elledge also employed textualist methods 
of interpretation similar in process, if not in result, with the court's 
method in Rosemont. The Elledge court also began its analysis by 
looking to the sections of the Act where the word "preschool" was 
added.224 However, the Elledge court specifically rejected the con­
clusion reached in Rosemont.225 Instead, the Tenth Circuit held 
that, because Congress specifically allowed states to substantively 
define "elementary" and "secondary" school,226 and conversely 
failed to refer to state law with "preschool," Congress intended to 
treat "preschools" differently.227 Additionally, the Tenth Circuit 
disagreed with the Rosemont court's textual interpretation that the 
distinguishing feature of a "preschool" is its primarily educational 
function in contrast to the custodial nature of a day care center.228 
Rejecting this textual interpretation, the court in Elledge held that 
the relevant section of the statute relates to enterprises with a pri­
marily custodial function as well as those with primarily an educa­
tional function.229 Thus, the court held that there is no distinction 
in the function of the enterprise.230 
As evidenced by the differing judicial interpretations of the 
same language, the textual approach is largely colored by the inter­
preter's presumptions. Specifically, in interpreting the 1972 amend­
ment, the value the interpreter gives to Congress' silence 
determines the textual interpretation of this silence. For instance, 
in Elledge, the court weighed silence as a stronger inference of Con­
221. See id. 
222. See id. 
223. See id. The trial court found that there was no guidance in state law con­
cerning the tenn "preschool." Therefore, the trial court held hearings to detennine the 
definition. See id. 
224. See United States Dep't of Labor v. Elledge, 614 F.2d 247, 249 (10th Cir. 
1980). 
225. See id. 
226. See supra notes 67 and 68 for the definitions of "elemc::ntary" and "secon­
dary" schools under the FLSA. 
227. See Elledge, 614 F.2d at 250. 
228. See id. at 249-50. 
229. See id. at 250. 
230. See id. 
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gress's intent. Thus, in textually interpreting the relevance of the 
definitions of "elementary" and "secondary" schools, the court in 
Elledge held that the state-law definitions were inapplicable to 
"preschool."231 The court in Rosemont, however, was less willing to 
interpret Congress's silence as a statement of intent. Thus, in inter­
preting the text, the Rosemont court found that an analysis into 
state-law definitions of "preschool" was relevant to analyzing the 
meaning of "preschool" under the FLSA.232 
The textualist approach is ultimately ineffectual as a means of 
interpreting the 1972 amendment to the FLSA because the inter­
preters' presumptions alter the substantive result of Congress' si­
lence in defining the term "preschool" in the 1972 amendment to 
the FLSA. Accordingly, textualist approaches fail to provide gui­
dance concerning the inclusion of "preschools" as covered enter­
prises under the 1972 amendment to the FLSA. 
C. 	 The Intent of Congress in Enacting the FLSA Suggests Broad 
Coverage in Favor of the Day Care Center Employee 
Each court charged with interpreting the 1972 amendment has 
recognized the absence of legislative history concerning the 1972 
amendment.233 However, in interpreting what businesses are cov­
ered by the inclusion of "preschool," the court in Elledge and Miss 
Paula's moved beyond the 1972 amendment to interpret the 
amendment's intent within the Act as a whole.234 
In Miss Paula's, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit employed an intentionalist approach to statutory in­
terpretation when it addressed the debate surrounding the inclusion 
of "elementary" and "secondary" schools in the 1966 amend­
ment.235 The court noted that the Senate had initially omitted these 
institutions due to the concern over the financial impact that mini­
mum wage and overtime requirements would have on state school 
231. 	 See id. 
232. 	 See Marshall v. Rosemont, 584 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1978). 
233. See Reich v. Miss Paula's Day Care Ctr., 37 F.3d 1191, 1193 (6th Cir. 1994) 
("[t]he statute's legislative history casts little light on whether Congress considered cus­
todial 'child day care centers' to be 'preschools"'); Elledge, 614 F.2d at 249 ("We find no 
legislative history of any help or significance."); Rosemont, 584 F.2d at 320 ("Congress 
... left the definition of 'preschool' undefined. Literally, it could apply from babes in 
arms to the first classification to be defined thereafter."). 
234. See supra Part H.C for a discussion of the intentionalist theory of statutory 
interpretation. 
235. 	 See Miss Paula's, 37 F.3d at 1193. 
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budgets.236 Although no record exists concerning why these busi­
nesses were ultimately included in the Act, the Sixth Circuit in­
ferred that their inclusion meant that Congress believed the 
benefits of coverage outweighed the detriment.237 Thus, the Sixth 
Circuit concluded that Congress's intent was to extend coverage to 
more employees despite potentially adverse economic conse­
quences. 
. Although the court in Elledge relied heavily on a textualist ap­
proach to interpretation as final confirmation for its position that 
the child day care center is a "preschool" within the meaning of the 
Act, the court found support in the FLSA's larger intent.238 To this 
end, the court in Elledge cited case precedent concerning the Act's 
purpose as a remedial and humanitarian statute.239 Thus, the court 
concluded that, where ambiguity exists, this humanitarian intent ad­
vises broad coverage in favor of the employee.24o 
The courts in Miss Paula's and Elledge agreed that Congress 
intended to extend coverage liberally in favor of the employee.241 
Nevertheless, the intentionalist approach fails because the focus of 
its inquiry is too narrow. For instance, while broad coverage in 
favor of the employee is consistent with the FLSA's anti-poverty 
purpose, this insight alone is insufficient precisely because modem 
circumstances affecting poverty have changed while the Act has re­
mained constant.242 Thus, as the court in Miss Paula's noted, 
although it may be the government's policy to eliminate low wage 
operations, complying with the FLSA's minimum wage and over­
time requirements may have the effect of placing an unmanageable 
burden' on the parents who are themselves low wage workers.243 
Thus, intentionalism, without a policy-centered focus, is ineffec­
tual.244 
236. See id. at 1193 n.4. 
237. See id. The court's reasoning could have been that, rather than a substantive 
reason for acquiescence, one chamber may merely have 'acceded to the other. See gen­
erally, Outzs; supra note 82, at 301, for a discussion of the legislative process of a statute 
from a proposed bill to enactment. 
238. See Elledge, 614 F.2d at 250-51. 
239. See id. at 251. 
240. See id. 
241. See id. at 250-51; Miss Paula's, 37 F.3d at 1197. 
242. See infra Part IV.D for a discussion of how modern circumstances affect the 
Act's minimum wage and overtime provisions. 
243. See Miss Paula's, 37 F.3d at 1197. 
244. See generally'Schreve, supra note 92, at 8. Schreve notes that an additional 
problem with ending the interpretive analysis with a review of the intent of Congress is 
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D. 	 A Policy-Centered Interpretation, Founded on Feminist 

Concerns, Recognizes the Complexity of the Issue 

Only the Sixth Circuit in Miss Paula's notes in dicta what might 
be considered a policy-centered analysis. However, the Sixth Cir­
cuit's use of these observations as a method of interpretation was 
restricted by its assumption that discussing the Act's inconsistencies 
was a legislative, not judicial, function. Therefore, the court kept its 
policy-centered observations from becoming an interpretive 
method. Thus, it remains unclear what result a policy-centered in­
terpretation of the 1972 amendment to the FLSA might have on the 
courts' analysis. 
A policy-centered analysis might ask three interrelated ques­
tions:245 first, using traditional methods of interpretation, whether 
day care workers are the kind of workers the FLSA was intended to 
protect; second, whether the traditional interpretation is consistent 
with the purpose of the Act; and third, to the extent that there is a 
conflict in policies, how might the judiciary inform the legislature of 
the inconsistency in the particular factual context at hand?246 
In particular, a policy-centered analysis, focused on feminist 
concerns, is a natural starting point to a policy-centered interpreta­
tion of the 1972 amendment to the FLSA. For instance, a broad 
interpretation of the 1972 amendment results in preschool workers' 
wages increasing. However, increased labor costs also will likely 
result in the cost of day care rising. The availability of low-cost day 
care affects women's ability to work outside the home, particularly 
single women, and thus, impacts low-income women's ability to 
participate in the economy on an equal basis.247 Similarly, because 
that "[i]n reality, ... language discloses only manifest intent-which mayor may not 
reflect actual legislative intent." [d. 
245. There are numerous ways a feminist analysis might begin to address the 
problem of interpreting the 1972 amendment to the FLSA. This is but one way to 
construct the analysis .. 
246. Feminist statutory interpretation instructs the interpreter's inquiry based on 
the notion that "[f]eminist theories share a view that much of women's experiences of 
their lives [have] been omitted in the standard scholarly and popular descriptions of the 
world." Resnik, supra note 118, at 1906. 
247. See Chris Tilly & Randy Albelda, University of Mass. at Boston, It'll Take 
More than a Miracle: Income in Single-Mother Families in Massachusetts, 1979-1987 
(1992) [hereinafter Tilly & Albelda, Occasional Paper]. This paper outlines why single­
mothers failed to experience the benefits of the "Massachusetts Miracle." In this paper 
the authors point out that the combination of children, one working-aged adult, and the 
adult being female creates a "triple whammy" that significantly depresses the family's 
earning power. See id. at 1-2; see also Women in the Workforce in the Year 2000, Daily 
Lab. Rep. (BNA), Apr. 13, 1988, available in WESTLAW, BNA-DLR Database (State­
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women are the large majority of the "preschool" workforce,248 a 
narrow interpretation that finds that preschools are not covered 
under the Act results in a female-dominated area of the workforce 
earning below minimum wage. 
Thus, a feminist inquiry forms the starting point of a policy­
centered analysis, in that a feminist inquiry recognizes that either a 
broad or narrow interpretation of the 1972 amendment to the 
FLSA results in a disproportionate impact on low-income women. 
Therefore, the question remains: How can the judiciary, in inter­
preting the 1972 amendment to the FLSA, bring to light the nature 
of the interpretive problem? 
1. 	 Are Day Care Center Workers the Kind of Workers the 
FLSA is Intended to Protect? 
The history of the FLSA suggests that the term "preschool" 
should be read broadly to include day care center workers.249 With 
each amendment to the Act, courts have consistently advocated a 
liberal construction of an increasingly broad coverage area in favor 
of the employee.250 Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that 
"Congress intended instead, to achieve a uniform national policy of 
guaranteeing compensation for all work or employment engaged in 
by employees covered by the Act. "251 
In particular, because women comprise most of the work force 
in the area of child care,252 broad coverage in favor of the day care 
center employee would effectuate a feminist goal of providing 
ment by Professor Nancy S. Barrett before the Joint Economic Committee's Subcom­
mittee on Investment, Jobs, and Prices) [hereinafter Statement of Professor Barrett]. In 
this statement, Professor Barrett said "improved child care services, more flexible leave 
policies and flexible working hours, and other supportive measures could make a con­
siderable difference in women's labor force participation." Id. 
248. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 126. 
249. See supra Part I.A-D; Willis, supra note 28, at 608. "Although the FLSA has 
been amended many times through the years, the congressional purpose of the Act, like 
those of many other social laws, has remained anchored in the Commerce Clause. It is 
under the guise of the broad commerce powers that the gradual, consistent extension of 
the coverage of the [FLSA] has been and will continue to be accomplished." Id. 
250. See Edwards v. Riverside Prod. Co., 85 F. Supp. 290, 293 (N.D. W.Va. 1949) 
(holding that the Act should be construed strictly in favor of the employee); Wood v. 
Central Sand & Gravel Co., 33 F. Supp. 40, 43 (W.D. Tenn. 1940) (indicating that Con­
gress manifestly intended the courts to apply coverage under the Act broadly and 
liberally). 
251. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers of Am., 
325 U.S. 161, 167 (1945) (holding that uniformity of coverage for employees engaged in 
the same work is required under the FLSA). 
252. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 126. 
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greater economic opportunities for women. Thus, as a preliminary 
matter, a policy-centered analysis overall accords wit!). the more 
traditional interpretation that there is, within the Act, a presump­
tion of inclusion in favor of the employee. 
2. 	 Is the Traditional Analysis Consistent with the Larger 
Purpose of the Act? 
. The second question concerns the purpose of the Act and, in 
particular, whether broad coverage in favor of the day care center 
employee is consistent with that purpose. From the Act's inception, 
its principal purpose has been to alleviate poverty.253 With each 
amendment to the Act, its anti-poverty purpose has remained con­
stant.254 The Act employs the minimum wage floor and maximum 
hours provisions to effectuate its anti-poverty goal.255 Despite nu­
merous amendments to the Act, the minimum wage and maximum 
hours provisions have consistently remained the principal means to 
effectuate the Act's purpose. Amendments to the minimum wage 
and maximum hours provisions have merely increased the mini­
mum wage, or increased the scope of coverage.256 Furthermore, 
until the 1966 amendment to the Act, the types of positions covered 
under the Act were traditionally male-dominated.257 In fact, the 
1966 amendment was partially in response to the recognition that 
many traditionally female positions were not covered under the 
Act.258 
Although the FLSA's anti-poverty purpose has remained con­
stant since its inception, workforce demographics have changed.259 
253. See supra Part LA for a discussion of the original and unchanging purpose of 
the FLSA. 
254. See 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1994). This section of the Act has remained substan­
tively the same since the Act's inception in 1938. Any amendments to this section have 
merely furthered the anti-poverty purpose by expanding the scope of coverage under 
the Act, or raising the minimum wage. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 93-259, 87 Stat. 245 (codi­
fied as amended at 29 U.S.c. § 202 (1994» (adding that "employment of persons in 
domestic service in households affects commerce"). 
255. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207 (1994). 
256. See supra Part I.B-D for a discussion of amendments to the FLSA that ex­
panded the scope of coverage under the minimum wage and maximum hours 
provisions. 
257. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of the purpose of the 1966 amendment to 
the FLSA. 
258. See 112 CONGo REc. H11273 (daily ed. May 24, 1966) (statement of Rep. 
Powell); see also supra note 56 for the text of Representative Powell's statement. 
259. From 1963 to 1988 the number of women working or looking for work 
outside the home increased by 29 million. See Statement of Professor Barrett, supra 
note 247. 
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The most dramatic change, relevant to the 1972 amendment to the 
FLSA, has been in the labor statistics of women with preschool chil­
dren. In 1960, fewer than 20% of women with preschool children 
worked outside the home, whereas in 1988 over 50% of these wo­
men worked outside the home.26o This dramatic change in women's 
work roles has affected the structure of family life and, conse­
quently, affected the needs of the modern workforce. In particular, 
since women are working in greater numbers, families can no 
longer rely on the services of a full-time homemaker.261 Further­
more, "[t]he feminization of poverty is real."262 For instance, work­
ing-aged women in Massachusetts earn only about two-thirds as 
much per week as do working-aged men.263 
An additional change in labor is that people are increasingly 
unable to work their way out of poverty. This phenomenon has 
occurred, in part, because since the 1980s, wages for less skilled 
workers decreased while wages for more skilled workers in­
creased.264 Additionally, the decrease in less skilled workers' abil­
ity to earn a living wage is further diminished by the cost of child 
care. For instance, in Massachusetts in 1995, a parent working full­
time, year round at minimum wage, had gross earnings of $8,840.265 
The average cost for licensed child care in Massachusetts was $5,000 
to $8,000 per year.266 Thus, the cost of child care was well over half 
of an individual's income. 
While the Act has remained constant in its anti-poverty pur­
pose, it has also remained static in its approach to eliminating pov­
260. See id. 
261. See id. 
262. David T. Ellwood, Child Support Enforcement and Insurance: A Real Wel­
fare Alternative 3 (Mar., 1992 revision) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Mal­
colm Wiener Center for Social Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 
. Harvard University). 
263. See Tilly & Albelda, Occasional Paper, supra note 247, at 13. 
264. See JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 1020 CONG., GROWTH IS NOT ENOUGH: WHY 
THE RECOVERY OF THE 1980's DID SO LITfLE TO REDUCE POVERTY (Comm. Print 
1991) (prepared by Rebecca M. Blank) [hereinafter 1991 JOINT ECONOMIC COMM. 
PRINT]; William B. Cannon, Enlightened Localism: A Narrative Account of Poverty and 
Education in the Great Society, 4 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 6, 58 (1985) ("For the vast 
majority of poor people in America today there is no exit from poverty, either for 
themselves or for their children, and they are beginning to recognize the permanent 
nature of this status. "). 
265. See Affidavit of Elaine Fersh, Executive Director of Parents United for 
Child Care, submitted in opposition to Massachusetts' Request for Waiver Pursuant to 
Section 1115 of the Social Security Act, May 9, 1995, at 1 [hereinafter Affidavit of 
Elaine Fersh]. 
266. See id. 
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erty through positive work hours regulation. Thus, in interpreting 
the 1972 amendment to the FLSA, because the FLSA is limited in 
scope to changes in the minimum wage and overtime provisions, 
the Act's anti-poverty purpose is thwarted. An interpretation of 
the 1972 amendment to the FLSA in favor of the day care center 
employee ignores the fact that economic and labor circumstances 
have changed while the Act has remained single-focused in its ap­
proach to eliminating poverty through minimum wage and overtime 
provisions.267 
For instance, the effect of a broad construction in favor of day 
care center workers may increase the costs of child care to the point 
of making it too costly for low-income parents.268 Similarly, a nar­
row construction holding that day care centers do not have to com­
ply with the FLSA's provisions contradicts the historical 
presumption of broad coverage in favor of the employee.269 Fur­
thermore, this interpretation would also disproportionately affect 
women because most day care workers are women.270 Thus, in in­
terpreting the 1972 amendment to the FLSA, courts are forced to 
choose between two groups of disadvantaged women. This occur­
rence is due to the failure of the FLSA to address the complex na­
ture of poverty. 
The economic realities of modern life suggest that for the 
FLSA to serve its purpose as an anti-poverty statute, more complex 
solutions are needed, such as an increase in available, affordable 
day care, to ensure that the purpose of the FLSA is not defeated.271 
267. The Act has addressed the issue of poverty by increasing minimum wage 
progressively over time. See 29 u.s.c. § 206 (1994). It is the position of this Note that 
this method no longer effectuates the FLSA's goals. 
268. See Affidavit of Elaine Fersh, supra note 265, at 1; see also ILLINOIS DEP'T 
OF PUBLIC AID REPORT, supra note 127. 
269. See supra Part I.B-C for a discussion of the historical source of this 
presumption. 
270. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 126. 
271. See Kathleen A. Murray, Child Care and the Law, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
261 (1985). Murray discusses several federal child care programs, concluding that cur­
rent subsidies are inadequate. Two of the subsidies cited include: Dependant Care 
Assistance Programs, see 26 U.S.C. § 129 (1994), and AFDC Child Care Expense Disre­
gard, see 42 U.S.c. § 602(a) (1994). See Murray, supra, at 290-97. However, current 
government subsidies are ineffective because waiting lists are extensive and, therefore, 
not every eligible family can receive a subsidy. See HEALTH, EDUC., AND HUMAN 
SERVICES DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE CHILD CARE: WORKING POOR AND 
WELFARE RECIPIENTS FACE SERVICE GAPS 15 (1994) (report to the Committee on Ed­
ucation and Labor, May 13, 1994) [hereinafter Child Care Report]. 
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3. 	 How the Judiciary Might Inform the Legislature of the 
Conflict in Policies: Applying a Policy-Centered 
Analysis to Miss Paula's 
The court in Miss Paula's noted the conflict concerning the 
consequences that broad coverage in' favor of child day care center 
workers had for day care center businesses as well as for the parents 
served by these businesses.272 However, the Sixth Circuit ended its 
"policy analysis" with the recognition that Congress may have in­
tended to eliminate low-wage operations.273 In light of the 
problems with the traditional approaches to statutory interpretation 
employed by federal courts thus far, this section suggests one way 
the Sixth Circuit in Miss Paula's might have applied a feminist pol­
icy-centered analysis to the facts in light of the 1972 amendment to 
the FLSA. 
The conclusion that the FLSA requires Miss Paula's to pay 
minimum wage and overtime may result in putting the day care 
center out of business.274 Alternatively, the center might remain in 
business by increasing its fees, or eliminating some workers to de­
crease its overhead. Increasing the cost of day care is presump­
tively unreasonable. because the parents in Miss Paula's are 
students or workers in one of the most economically depressed ar­
eas in the United States.275 The elimination of low-cost day care 
forces parents to either pay more for day care or stay home with 
their children.276 Therefore, the parents must choose between 
working or caring for their children.277 
Working is not a logical choice because if day care rates in­
272. See Reich v. Miss Paula's Day Care Ctr., 37 F.3d 1191, 1197 (6th Cir. 1994). 
273. See iii. 
274. See id. The fear that increasing the scope of coverage under the Act would 
result in enterprises going out of business was expressed with each amendment that 
broadened coverage. See supra Part I.B-D for a thorough discussion of the issues in­
volved in expanding the scope of coverage under the Act. 
275. See Miss Paula's, 37 F.3d at 1192. 
276. Department of Labor statistics from 1991 (unpublished) show that the lower 
a family's income is, the greater the percentage of income is spent on day care: 
Percent of Income 
Monthly Family Income Spent on Daycare 
Under $1,500 22% 
1,500-$2,999 11 % 
$3,000-$4,499 7% 
$4,500 and over 5% 
Unpublished Department of Labor Statistics, 1991; see also Affidavit of Elaine Fersh, 
supra note 265. 
277. Certainly, there may be other choices for the parents such as leaving the 
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crease, most, if not all, of the parents' money earned will go to pay 
day care costs and expenses.278 Thus, requiring Miss Paula's to 
comply with the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime provisions 
places these parents in a lose-lose situation, where they are forced 
to remove their child from day care and stop working. Addition­
ally, the increased labor costs may, in turn, force the center out of 
business. The elimination of one business in a rural area with se­
verely limited economic opportunities would generate a higher un­
employment rate which contradicts the policy of the FLSA.279 
Alternatively, not requiring Miss Paula's to comply with the 
requirements of the FLSA's minimum wage and overtime provi­
sions is inconsistent with case precedent suggesting broad coverage 
in favor of the employee. Although a job paying under minimum 
wage may be comparatively attractive to unemployment in the eco­
nom:ically depressed region of Appalachia, the Act's application 
cannot depend on regional economic factors. Furthermore, the 
provisions of the Act are intended to serve an anti-poverty purpose 
by increasing wages. Thus, any interpretation that advocates wages 
below minimum wage cannot be consistent with the FLSA. 
Although broad coverage in favor of the day care center em­
ployee is consistent with case precedent and the history of the 
FLSA as an anti-poverty provision,280 the court is unable to effectu­
ate this purpose adequately under the Act. While requiring Miss 
Paula's to comply with the Act's provisions increases the economic 
opportunities for some workers, it effectively displaces other work­
ers by making day care too costly for low-income workers. Thus, in 
effect, interpreting Congress's treatment of "preschool" to include 
day care centers as covered enterprises defeats the Act's anti-pov­
erty purpose because of Congress's failure to adequately address 
the day care needs of the working poor.281 
Although not directly part of the FLSA, the issue of adequate 
low-cost day care is inextricably linked to the interpretation of the 
child with family or friends. Presumably, however, the parents already considered this 
before spending the money to send their· child to day care. 
278. The parents would have to earn well over minimum wage to make day care 
in the center economically feasible. This seems unlikely given the center's clientele of 
primarily college students and low-income working mothers. See Affidavit of Elaine 
Fersh, supra note 265. 
279. See supra Part I.A for a discussion of the FLSA's anti-poverty purpose. 
280. See supra Part I.A-C for a discussion of the history of the FLSA as an anti­
poverty provision. 
281. See Murray, supra note 271, at 290-97 for a list of some of the current federal 
subsidies available for child care. 
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1972 amendment to the FLSA. Congress should study the negative 
effects of broad coverage of the FLSA's scope with an eye toward 
creating supplemental provisions that fully address the complex na­
ture of poverty such as the need for sufficient, low-cost day care.282 
Absent an initiative by Congress in this direction, a feminist policy­
centered analysis that outlines clearly the intertwined nature of 
low-cost daY' care and the FLSA's anti-poverty purpose is a neces­
sary interpretive method. 
In the end, a policy-centered analysis, founded on a feminist 
interpretive analysis, might reach the same result as the Sixth Cir­
cuit did in Miss Paula's: that is, that the center. is required to comply 
with the minimum wage and maximum hours provisions of the 
FLSA. However, under a policy-centered analysis, judicial scrutiny 
of the causes and effects of the outcome would be explicitly dis­
cussed as part of the court's opinion. In addition, this method 
should reveal other areas the legislature might need to address in 
order to effectuate the FLSA's goals. Information could be shared 
with Congress through the vehicle of section 204( d)(l) of the FLSA 
which provides that the Secretary of Labor shall report to Congress 
biennially to make recommendations for amendments to the ACt.283 
The Secretary of Labor's Annual Report to Congress includes a liti­
gation section. In the litigation section, the Secretary outlines the 
results of litigation on the FLSA presumably with the intent to out­
line for Congress significant problem areas. Thus, if the judiciary 
did not view policy as beyond its purview, the conflicts and inconsis­
tencies of the Act as seen through the eyes of the judiciary, might 
be revealed through this process. 
Ultimately, because the Act. fails to address the relationship 
that exists between the Act's provisions, its purpose and broader 
economic realities, public policy considerations become paramount 
in the interpretive process. Although traditionally public policy is­
sues were thought to transcend the judicial function, a policy-cen­
tered analysis of the FLSA suggests that public policy issues are 
intimately tied to the judicial role as administrators of justice. 
282. See Child Care Report, supra note 271, at 13-15 for a discussion of the gaps 
in child care subsidies for eligible families. 
283. See 29 U.S.c. § 204(d)(1) (1994). This provision requires the Secretary of 
Labor to annually evaluate the state of employment opportunities, and propose legisla­
tion consistent with effectuating the Act's objectives. See id. In Fiscal Year 1990, the 
Secretary's 26 page report to Congress included a six page litigation section. See 1991 
MINIMUM WAGE AND MAXIMUM HOURS REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 6-13. 
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CONCLUSION 

Because of the lack of assistance for poor working people with 
children, broad inclusion in favor of the day care center employee 
under the FLSA, while logical given the Act's history, intent, and 
purpose to improve employees' work status, conflicts with the es­
sence of the Act as an anti-poverty statute. Although adequate day 
care is not directly related to the FLSA's provisions, this public pol­
icy issue is inextricably entwined with interpretation of the Act's 
provisions. 
This Note does not suggest that the minimum wage and over­
time provisions of the Act should be abolished, nor that broad cov­
erage under the Act should be discontinued. Instead, this Note 
suggests that while the judicial role in interpreting the Act is re­
stricted by legislative inadequacies, the judicial role should not be 
restrained from analyzing the effects of these inadequacies. There­
fore, a policy-centered method that reveals the problems inherent 
in the Act, as a feminist policy-centered analysis does, is not beyond 
the purview of the court. 
Particularly, where legislative inadequacies thwart the inter­
pretive process, the judiciary must take public policy issues into 
consideration when interpreting the Act. Furthermore, the Act 
contains a vehicle for reporting the conflicts which emerge in inter­
preting the Act. Section 204( d)(l) specifically requires the Secre­
tary of Labor to make recommendations biennially for further 
legislative action. 
A feminist policy-centered method is, nevertheless, limited. 
Congress must address the complexities of poverty if the Act is to 
continue its anti-poverty purpose. Simple answers, such as raising 
the minimum wage, are no longer effective to increase employee 
bargaining power and eliminate poverty. In fact, they may have the 
opposite effect. Thus, for the Fair Labor Standards Act to remain a 
viable anti-poverty statute, Congress ultimately must respond to the 
increasingly complex circumstances which create poverty in a com­
prehensive and systematic way. 
Laura C. Edmonds 
